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History
Missoula and

Lolo

Director: Dan L. Flores
Missoula and western Montana are home to a microcosm of
national interests involved in the wilderness preservation
debate.
This microcosm existed and continues to exist
within a unique political atmosphere where wildernessrelated events routinely make headlines in the local news
media. Since Missoula represents a microcosm for wilderness
issues and it is a typical western American municipality, a
historical study of wilderness using Missoula and its
western Montana environs as examples will reflect the larger
history of the evolution of wilderness preservation in the
United States.
This study identifies the components of the microcosm in
Missoula and western Montana and then covers the history of
statutory wilderness preservation in the United States
Forest Service from 1891 to 1992. Missoula, Lolo National
Forest and other pertinent regional examples are used to
highlight the history of wilderness preservation in the
Forest Service, charting events from the establishment of
the forest reserves to the current polarized wilderness
stalemate in Montana.
Legislative events, court cases, and
local and state politics receive special focus along with
the problems the Forest Service has experienced as a result
of the movement to preserve wilderness.
Extensive primary and secondary research support this
study.
The author
conducted
interviews with
many
individuals who were responsible for influencing the events
described in this history.
Corroborating the oral
interviews are numerous archival documents from both the
University of Montana and the various Forest Service offices
located in Missoula.
The standard secondary works in
wilderness history are referenced to place the primary
research into context.
The culmination of the wilderness preservation story has
yet to occur. Missoula and western Montana face increasing
polarization
between
preservationist
and
utilitarian
interests,
preventing a legislative resolution to the
wilderness debate.
This polarization also reflects the
state of affairs in public land law in the West, and
suggests that if Missoula and Montana can find a solution,
then that solution could serve as a model for the nation.
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INTRODUCTION

In western Montana civilization and wilderness collide in a juxtaposition that
illuminates the debate over the future of wilderness as an entity in the United
States. Along Interstate 90 north of Missoula, elk are visible grazing on hills
that serve simultaneously as winter wildlife range, human homesites, and a city
refuse disposal area. Beyond the herd of elk, the snowcapped peaks of the
Rattlesnake Wilderness Area emerge above the smog trapped by a winter's
temperature inversion. Within the city, a bald eagle surveys the waters of the
Clark Fork River as cars whiz by on a nearby bridge.
Missoula and the surrounding Lolo National Forest are the setting of one of
the great natural, political, and spiritual confrontations of Western American
history: that of wilderness preservation. No other location in the West contains
such a passionate, and nearly balanced complement of people with an interest in
either wilderness preservation or forest utilization. National wilderness policy
here affects a microcosm, for wilderness purposes, of the coterminous states of
the American West. Wilderness history in Missoula and the surrounding Lolo
Forest both reflects and influences the larger history of wilderness in the entire
West.
Geographically, the Lolo National Forest occupies part of two distinctive
environmental regions in the northern Rocky Mountains and western Montana.

1
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The western half and a northeastern portion of the forest lie in the Columbia
Rockies region. This region is characterized by lush, humid, forested mountains
and valleys. Comparatively few people inhabit this area, and those who do
reside in small towns nestled in the narrow valleys. Lolo's central lands fall
into the Broad Valley Rockies region. A more arid, sparsely vegetated, and
populated landscape distinguishes this area. Missoula lies in one of these broad
valleys and ranks as the most populous city completely enclosed within the
Rocky Mountains.1
In 1992 Bruce Vento, Democrat Congressman from Minnesota, introduced the
National Forest Wilderness Management Act, HR 4325, that also called for the
establishment of an Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute at Missoula.
At the close of the 102nd Congress however, Vento's legislation was still in
debate. Most probably the Forest Service administratively designated Missoula
the site for the Leopold Institute in response to Vento's proposed bill.
The United States Forest Service maintains a considerable presence in
Missoula. The Northern Region's headquarters, an Aerial Fire Depot and
Smokejumper's training center, the offices of Lolo National Forest, and

'John A. Alwin, Western Montana: A Portrait of the Land and its People,
Montana Geographic Series Number Five, (Helena, MT: Montana Magazine,
Inc., 1983), 4-5.

3

Missoula Ranger District call Missoula home.2 Also in Missoula, the
University of Montana provides a location for a laboratory of the Forest
Service's Intermountain Research Station. Author Stephen Pyne called Missoula
a "Forest Service company town."3

Recently, the Forest Service announced

that the Missoula laboratory will house the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research
Institute.4
Missoula's selection did not come without some controversy within the Forest
Service. Other locations such as Boulder and Fort Collins, Colorado, competed
for the institute. Negatives associated with the Missoula site included its remote
northern Rockies location and somewhat small metropolitan area. What

2Forest

service administration emanates from Washington, D.C. down to
nine regional headquarters: Northern Region-Montana, northern Idaho, North
Dakota, northeast South Dakota, headquarters at Missoula, MT; Pacific
Northwest Region- Washington and Oregon, headquarters at Portland, OR;
California Region, headquarters at San Francisco; Intermountain Region- Utah,
Nevada, western Wyoming and southern Idaho, headquarters at Ogden, UT;
Southwestern Region- Arizona and New Mexico, headquarters at Albuquerque,
NM; Rocky,Mountain Region- Colorado, central and eastern Wyoming, South
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; SoutJaem-Region- 13 southern states,
headquarters at Atlanta, GA; Eastern Region- 20 midwest, Great Lake, and
eastern states, headquarters at Milwaukee, WI; and the Alaska Region,
headquarters at Juneau. Below the regions are the 155 national forests, headed
by a forest supervisor and within the forests are numerous ranger districts, the
lowest administrative level.
3Stephen

Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural
Fire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 257.
4

Sherry Devlin, "Two USFS wilderness centers planned for Missoula
County," Missoulian, January 12, 1993, 1.

4

attracted the Forest Service to the Missoula site was the combination of
wilderness interests located there. The research laboratory has been instrumental
in the development of wilderness management techniques, including the Limits
of Acceptable Change (LAC) system.5

Another contributing factor to the

decision for Missoula was the presence of the University's Wilderness Institute,
an influential study group uniquely situated on a liberal arts campus and
surrounded by millions of acres of designated wilderness.6
The Forest Service also announced in early 1993 that Lolo National Forest's
historic Nine Mile Remount Station, a fire-fighting center and ranger district
headquarters, will house the Arthur Carhart Wilderness Training Center.7 This
selection acknowledged the past wilderness skills training conducted at Nine
Mile, including a three year program educating the Forest Service's upper
echelon leaders in wilderness management issues.

5The

LAC system is a Forest Service "framework for establishing acceptable
and appropriate resource and social conditions in recreation settings." Increasing
public use of wilderness areas threatens the qualities of naturalness and solitude.
The LAC system seeks to control the change associated with such widespread
use. George H. Stankey, David N. Cole, Robert C. Lucas, Margaret E. Petersen,
and Sidney S. Frissell, "The Limits of Acceptable Change (LAC) System for
Wilderness Planning," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,
General Technical Report INT-176, January 1985, Summary, 1. Forest Service
managers first applied LAC to Montana's Bob Marshall Wilderness complex.
interview with Elizabeth G. Close, Wilderness Specialist, Office of
Wilderness, Recreation, and Cultural Resources, United States Forest Service,
Northern Region, January 22, 1993.
7Devlin,

Missoulian, January 12, 1993.
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Completing the complement of professional forestry elements in Missoula is
the School of Forestry at the University of Montana.

Established in 1913, the

School of Forestry built a national reputation both as an educational center and
as a controversial critic of Forest service policy with 1970's appraisal of forest
management in the Bitterroot National Forest. In 1974 the school created the
Wilderness Institute, an educational and informational center for wilderness.
In 1992, the Boone and Crocket Club announced their intention to move their
headquarters from Washington, D.C. to Missoula. In Missoula, Boone and
Crocket will join other national conservation organizations that maintain either
headquarters or regional offices in the city. Groups that have a major presence
in Missoula are the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, the National Wildlife
Federation, the Craighead Institute, the Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society.
Citizen activism, born in the 1960's, along with the decline of the Anaconda
Company's influence in Montana politics, converted what had been a
Republican town into a city known for its political activism. Topping the
political agenda are natural resource issues, from smog control to wilderness
preservation. This activist tradition, perhaps more than any other aspect,
identifies Missoula as the 'front line' of the wilderness debate. Other cities in
the West contain sawmills, universities, Forest Service offices, and nearby
wildlands; Ogden, Utah is one example. But the fiery heritage of political
dissent keeps wilderness issues on the local newspaper's front page and confers

6

upon Missoula and the Lolo Forest area a unique position as a leader in the
wilderness debate.8
Most interesting among the newly-formed activist groups in Missoula are: the
Alliance for the Wild Rockies, promoting bioregional wilderness legislation to a
national audience; Wilderness Watch, a wilderness management watchdog
group; Friends of the Rattlesnake, with a tradition of successful wilderness
activism; and a spattering of new wise use groups, contesting further wilderness
preservation at the expense of local economies. The extremist environmental
group, Earth First! maintains a considerable presence in Missoula.
Politically, Missoula has had an influence on natural resource issues wholly
out of proportion to its population size. Missoula is a place of cultural diversity;
loggers share city-space with University intellectuals and environmental
activists. Since natural resource news is front-page in Missoula, participants in
natural resource issues enjoy a high level of public exposure, enabling them to
be big fish in an issue that commands national environmental interest.
Missoula's crossroads setting, political uniqueness, and citizen environmental
activism on all sides combine to replicate an almost Athenian style of
democracy.9
interview with Close, January 22, 1993. Missoula's daily newspaper is
called The Missoulian.
interview with Thomas Payne, retired professor of political science at the
University of Montana, November 5, 1992, Missoula, MT, notes.

7

The esteemed writer of Western history and culture Wallace Stegner
recognized Missoula as a "quintessential" example of the West. According to
Stegner, Missoula had made "itself into a place and is likely to remain one."
Missoula reflects Western diversity with its political and cultural milieu.
Writers, including the nationally known Ivan Doig and the late Norman
Maclean, have centered their works around Missoula and its environs.10
Finally, Missoula's surrounding Lolo National Forest area contains numerous
remnant wildernesses, both statutory and unprotected, or de facto. Within an
hour's drive from downtown in any direction and one can encounter wilderness.
This presence of wilderness adds to the immediacy of the region's wilderness
debate and completes the microcosmic picture. The history of the development
of statutory wilderness viewed from Missoula, both reflects and anticipates
historical wilderness issues in the larger American West.

10Wallace

Stegner, The American West as Living Space, (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1988), 85.

CHAPTER ONE: Forests, Fires, and Wilderness

The United States' federal government gradually established administrative
control over the western forests during the late 1800s and the first decade of the
1900s. Administrators first concentrated on conserving these western forests
from fire-caused destruction for future use as a supplier of the nation's need for
wood products. Occurring at the same time as the federal conservation of
forests for future utilization was a different sort of conservation. This
conservation, or preservation, looked to ensure the continued existence of wild
lands, with minimal human influence. Increasingly as the twentieth century
evolved, the preservationist impulse would compete with utilitarianism for
public favor as a forest management practice.
Before the arrival of white people, primeval forests, wild and vast, stretched
out in all directions from the juncture of the five valleys of western Montana
called Hell Gate, later known as Missoula. Flathead Indians occupied this
wilderness when the explorers Lewis and Clark and David Thompson travelled
through and signaled the onslaught of white conquest. Since that time, as
whites fanned out all over the west, the forested lands of western Montana faced
gradual, increasing pressure to yield mineral wealth, provide water, and supply
timber to the expected legions of homebuilders. The federal government in
8

9

Washington, D.C. claimed these lands as public domain and originally sought
to dispose of them through various settlement incentive bills such as the
Homestead Acts and the Timber and Stone Act.
As the federal policies of public land disposal bogged down in speculative
corruption, new voices began to question the wisdom of dispensing with the
public forested lands. The idea of placing the forests under federal protection
arose in response to what appeared to be an impending timber famine in the
United States. Western forests were subject to timber trespass- the unmanaged,
free of charge, cutting of timber. Despite an 1831 statute that prohibited the
harvest of public domain timber, both individuals and organized firms cut timber
from the public domain at will.11
Also influential in the development of protected forests, was the issue of
watershed conservation. Bernhard Fernow, German forester and pioneer in
American forestry, among others, battled the United States Geological Survey
and no less a figure than John Wesley Powell over reserving forested lands in
the West to facilitate watershed management. Powell feared that federal forest
reserves would lock out future reclamation projects, and besides Powell saw no
shortage of timber in the West. Fernow, echoing the sentiments of George

nCharles

F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land. Water, and the
Future of the West, (Washington, D.C., Covello, CA: Island Press, 1992), 120121.
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Perkins Marsh in Man and Nature, preached the value of timber stands as
defense against evaporation, and the secretary of the American Forestry
Association, J. B. Harrison, warned of the problems of sedimentation to western
agriculture if people stripped the forests away.12
Fires in the western forests convinced some for the need for protection. The
first two chiefs of the Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture
noted with alarm the amount of western timber consumed by fire. These losses,
combined with the public's perception that land resources were diminishing
rapidly, especially through railroad land give-away legislation, provided a
powerful call for forest protection.13
Ironically, aside from the fires, the growing calls for forest protection had little
to do with the western forests. In the northern Rocky Mountains the intensive
harvest of the forests would await the post-World War II housing boom. Forest
protection in the late nineteenth century sprung from the rapid depletion of the
Great Lakes region's white pine forests. People responded to a perception of

12Donald

J. Pisani, "Forests and Reclamation, 1891-1911," in The Origins of
the National Forests, ed. Harold K. Steen, (Durham, NC: Forest History Society,
1992), 241; George Perkins Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action: A
Last Revision of Man and Nature, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907),
236-237.
"Wilkinson, 121-122.
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scarcity in the timber resource, as Chicago consumed the remaining commercial
white pines.14
Congress responded in 1891 with a hastily written addition to a bill to repeal
the Timber Culture Act that allowed the President to "set apart and reserve"
forested tracts of public domain. President Benjamin Harrison wasted little time
in exercising his new power, and in less than a month after the passage of the
'Creative' act, designated the Yellowstone Park Forest Reserve.15
Six years after the Creative Act, on February 22, 1897, President Grover
Cleveland established the first forest reserves in Montana. The first three
reserves, part of Cleveland's Washington's Birthday Reserves, were the
Bitterroot, the Lewis and Clarke, and the Flathead.16 A forestry commission,
that included America's first trained forester, Gifford Pinchot of the National
Academy of Sciences, recommended the forests for reservation to President
Cleveland.17 These reservations met with opposition, not just from loggers,

14Patricia

Nelson Limerick, "The Forest Reserves and the Argument for a
Closing Frontier," in The Origins of the National Forests, ed. by Harold K.
Steen, 15. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West,
(New York: W. W Norton and Company, 1991), 200-205.
15Samuel

Trask Dana and Sally K. Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy: Its
Development in the United States, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, 1980), 56-58.
16Proclamation,

February 22, 1897, 29 Stat. 899, 907, 911.

""Forestry Reserves," Great Falls Tribune, February 23, 1897, 1. Dana and
Fairfax, 60.
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miners, and homesteaders, but also from congressional delegations in the West.
Congressmen questioned the need for forest reservations, calling them an
"injustice to the people" and they disputed the claim of a timber famine by
observing there was "no danger of exhausting the timber supply."18
By 1897, significant acreage in the West was forest reserve land; however the
administration of these lands was far from clear or effective. Congress
attempted to address this shortcoming by the passage of the Organic Act or
Pettigrew Amendment. The job of managing the reserves fell to the Department
of the Interior and the act provided detailed guidance on the subjects of timber
appraisals, sales, and use by settlers. Also included in the act were provisions
for prospecting for minerals, water use, civil and criminal jurisdiction, and
boundary modification.19
At the time the Department of the Interior assumed control of the forest
reserves, the expertise in the discipline of forestry rested in the Agriculture
Department's Division of Forestry and in the person of Bernhard Fernow.
German born and educated, Fernow was instrumental in the creation of national
forest reserves in the United States. As the Division of Forestry's chief, Fernow

18"Is

unsatisfactory," Great Falls Tribune. February 24, 1897, 1.

1930

Stat. 34, 1897.
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changed the character of the division from that of an information source to
developing real forest management policy.20
Fernow faced the reality that his division lacked forests to manage, since the
General Land Office of the Department of the Interior handled the forest
reserves. This problem did not prevent Fernow from trying to implement what
he considered sound forestry principles, German principles, into the
administration of the American forests. First and foremost, forests existed to
grow trees and foresters were to create a continuity of forest crops. This
entailed a highly scientific, even "arithmetical" system that stressed the
evaluation of soils and taking tree measurements so that the future timber yield
could be determined. For Fernow, forests must be highly productive and
managed; his vision for American forestry held no place for wilderness.21
Upon Fernow's retirement in 1898, Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson
selected an American forester to replace him, Gifford Pinchot. Trained in
forestry in France, Pinchot picked up the task of crusading for effective timber
management in the United States. Two fundamental management problems
existed, the first was the need for fire control and on that most agreed. The
20Dana

and Fairfax, 51; for a biography of Fernow, see Andrew Denny
Rodgers, III, Bernhard Fernow: A Story of North American Forestry, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951).
21Char

Miller, "Wooden Politics: Bernhard Fernow and the Quest for a
National Forest Policy, 1876-1898," in The Origins of the National Forests, ed.
by Harold K. Steen, 290-292.
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second was the need for sound harvesting practices. Pinchot preached the
gospel of sustained yield forestry, implying continuous timber production by
maintaining a balance between net growth and harvest.22
Vital to Pinchot's plans for American forestry was the ascendancy of Theodore
Roosevelt to the presidency following the assassination of William McKinley.
In Roosevelt, Pinchot found a kindred spirit and together the two men would
launch the Golden Age of Conservation in the United States. Pinchot enjoyed
extraordinary access to Roosevelt and played a key role in determining the
progressive conservation agenda. This agenda included a reversal of the long
held policy of public land disposal. Instead, federal retention of land became
the goal.23
As had Fernow, Pinchot desired the transfer of the forest reserves to his
control in the Department of Agriculture. Toward this end, Pinchot worked to
convince western commodity interests and congressional delegations that he
would better take care of the reserves. Scandals in the General Land Office
aided Pinchot's cause and in February 1905, Congress passed the Transfer
Act.24

22Charles

H. Stoddard, Essentials of Forestry Practice, second edition, (New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), 319.
23Dana

and Fairfax, 72-73.

24Dana

and Fairfax, 81.
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Important not only for the transfer of the reserves to Pinchot and the
Agriculture Department, the Transfer Act provided that all money received from
the sale of any land or resources from the reserves go into a special fund, for
use for a period of five years for the reserves at the discretion of the Secretary
of Agriculture. After that, the treasury would collect the proceeds from the
forest reserves. This stipulation reflected Congress's intention that the reserves
become independently supporting.25 The Transfer Act completed the first phase
of legislative protection of the western, public forested lands. Forest
administration, both physically and in expertise, emanated from one source,
Gifford Pinchot.26
Pinchot intended the forest reserves to serve the interests of a vigorous,
expanding nation. When Congress delivered the reserves to the Division of
Forestry, Pinchot changed the agency's name to the United States Forest
Service. The word 'service' reflected Pinchot's desire that the agency remain
aware of its public service mission.27
One of Pinchot's first actions as chief of the Forest Service was to write
himself a letter delineating the goals and purposes of the agency. Prepared for

25Transfer
26Dana

Act of February 1, 1905, 33 Stat. 624.

and Fairfax, 81.

27Harold

K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History. (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1976), 74-75.
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the signature of Secretary Wilson, Pinchot's letter stressed that "the resources of
the reserves are for use" and that conservation would ensure the permanence of
those resources.28 Support for the developing American West formed the basis
of the reserves' existence. Priority to use forest reserve resources went to the
homebuilders and local, small businesses and industries, since they were the
agents converting the West into a productive, settled region. When conflict
arose over the multiple resource uses, the principle of "greatest good for the
greatest number in the long run" governed land managers' decisions. Pinchot's
letter, historian David Clary wrote, was the Forest Service's Magna Carta and
the utilitarian philosophy of resource use contained in the letter set policy in the
new agency and continues to influence the management of the nation's public
forests today.29
Apart from utilitarian conservation (that primarily emphasized conserving
natural resources for future economic exploitation), a distinct preservationist
movement evolved under the leadership of John Muir. Born in Scotland, and
raised and educated in Wisconsin, Muir personified the struggle to preserve wild
places for the inherent value of wild places. Muir rejected the dominant
anthropocentric world view held by many of his fellow citizens, and instead
conceived of humans as members of nature and not superior beings above
28Dana

and Fairfax, 82.

29Clary,

22; Dana and Fairfax, 82; and Steen, 75.
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nature. Espousing a pantheist philosophy, Muir viewed wilderness in deeply
religious terms. Although reminiscent of the transcendentalists Emerson and
Thoreau, Muir developed a separate sense of the indispensability of wilderness.
Wilderness was a place to seek out the meaning of life, a spiritual sanctuary
from the mundane rigors of civilized existence.30
Muir began his championing of wilderness in the 1870's, he played a crucial
role in the establishment of California's Yosemite National Park in 1890, and
participated in the founding of the Sierra Club. Muir also held great hope for
the forest reserves until he had a falling out with Gifford Pinchot over sheep
grazing in the reserves. Although he did not oppose the creation of the forest
reserves after his break with Pinchot, Muir directed most of his efforts toward
the national parks where he considered wilderness values had better
protection.31
The controversy over the building of a dam in Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy
Valley proved to be Muir's defining moment as a wilderness activist. His
30Max

Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness: From Pre-Historv to the Age
of Ecology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), chapter on John Muir,
172-204; Steven Fox, John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation
Movement, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1981), 70, 80; Frederick
Turner, Rediscovering America: John Muir in His Time and Ours, (San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1985), 66-71; Michael F. Cohen, The Pathless
Way: John Muir and the American Wilderness, (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1984).
31Roderick

Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973), 131-138.
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vociferous opposition to the inundation of one of his favorite valleys in the
Sierra Nevada constructed the model of wilderness advocacy that would find
emulation in future preservation battles.32 Muir lost the Hetch Hetchy battle,
San Francisco's water supply carried more weight in Washington D.C., but in a
significant way wilderness preservation ideology reached the American
people.33
Americans were ready to receive Muir's message at the time of the Hetch
Hetchy controversy. Inconceivable fifty years earlier, the controversy illustrated
the progress non-utilitarian preservation made in the late nineteenth century and
in the first decade of the twentieth. The traditional perception of wilderness as
an evil to be subdued had changed; even supporters of the dam did not cast the
issue as good versus evil. Muir's challenge of the dam inspired this change in
attitude and announced the arrival of a full-time wilderness advocacy in
contraposition to the type of utilitarianism preached by Gifford Pinchot.34
As Muir initiated America's preservationist movement, Theodore Roosevelt
continued to withdraw large tracts of western forests. Missoula's surrounding
forests came under formal federal administration during Roosevelt's presidency.

320elschlaeger,
33For

172.

a description of Muir and the Hetch Hetchy controversy, see Turner,
336-343; Nash, 161-181.
34Nash,

181.

19

First, TR established the Hell Gate Forest Reserve, east of Missoula, by
proclamation on October 3, 1905. By November 1906, two more area forest
reserves existed, Lolo Forest Reserve, west of Missoula, withdrawn on
September 20, 1906, and the Missoula Forest Reserve, southeast of Missoula,
created on November 6, 1906.35 As technical advances such as the telephone
and the automobile facilitated the physical management of these reserves, the
Forest Service consolidated the forests. Missoula Forest absorbed part of the
Hell Gate in 1908, and Lolo Forest divided the Missoula Forest with Deerlodge
Forest in 1931.36
In keeping faith with Pinchot's utilitarian principles, the predominant
occupation, ahead of grazing or mining, of the Forest Service in the National
Forests of the Northern Rockies in the pre-World War II era was fire
suppression.37

Fire had long ranked as a top priority menace, the first two

chiefs of the Agriculture Department's Division of Forestry, Franklin Hough and

35Proclamation

of October 3, 1905, 34 Stat. 3168, Proclamation of
September 20, 1906, 34 Stat. 3234, and Proclamation of November 6, 1906, 34
Stat. 3259; United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Historical
List of National Forest Names," June 1, 1957, 6-7.
36Executive

Order 882, July 1, 1908; Executive Order 5761, December 16,
1931; United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Division of
Engineering, "Establishment and Modification of National Forest Boundaries: A
Chronologic Record 1891-1968," Washington, D.C. June 1968, 22, 64.
37The

name "National Forests" replaced "Forest Reserves" on March 4, 1907
by an Act of Congress, 34 Stat. 1269. The new name reflected Pinchot's idea
that the forests were to support national growth.
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Nathaniel Egleston in the 1880's and 1890's mentioned in their reports the
immense devastation caused in western forests by fire.38 Fire became the
enemy of the utilitarian forest managers because it degraded the potential timber
value of any particular forest. Culturally and economically, burned forests
represented a waste of resources.39
In 1908, Pinchot organized the national forests into districts, later called
regions. Missoula was the site of the northern district headquarters that
administered the forests of northern Idaho, Montana, and the western part of
North Dakota. During the period before World War II, the rangers of the
Northern District occupied themselves with fire suppression, grazing, and some
timber management.40 They considered their job custodial in nature, keeping
the forests 'green' for future utilitarian purposes.41
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Land ownership and the historical development of the lands contained in the
Northern District explain why timber management commanded scant attention in
the early days. Most of the desirable, easily obtained commercial timber, white
and ponderosa pine, fell into private hands prior to the original forest reserves'
withdrawal from the public domain. Most of the Montana lands that supported
feasibly harvested commercial forests, valley stands and timber in proximity to
rail lines fell under the ownership of two large corporations, Anaconda
Company and the Northern Pacific Railroad. These corporations traced their
ownership back to railroad land grants and perfected claims under the various
land disposal laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.42
Private interests thus controlled vast amounts of commercial timber, rendering
the widespread harvest of national forest timber unnecessary. Northern Region
forests, as with all forests, experienced periods of fire throughout the millennia.
Fire, consuming all the forested acres at one time or another, played an integral
role in the pristine ecosystems of the northern Rockies. With the advent of
federal management, however, rangers of the Forest Service sought to eradicate
fire from the natural realm and, by constructing road and trail networks, fire
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lookouts, and equipment caches, opened up significant tracts of wilderness for
future development.
Fire destroyed potential timber receipts, threatened human habitations and
adjacent private lands, and foreclosed management options. Thus, the rangers of
the Forest Service considered fire as public enemy number one. Memories of
devastating fire seasons, such as 1889, spurred the development of strategies to
suppress fire. But, perhaps no fire season had more impact on Forest Service
policy than the epic one of 1910.
Arriving on the heels of a drought that started in 1909, the fires of the summer
of 1910 were particularly destructive of both timber and human life. In the
Northern District's forests, those in Idaho suffered most, but Montana forests
such as Lolo also experienced considerable losses. Northern District saw more
than six billion board feet of timber on one and a quarter million acres go up in
smoke. Three-hundred million board feet burned on Lolo National Forest.43
Most significantly, eighty-seven firefighters lost their lives along with countless
numbers of animals and fish.44 The holocaust of 1910 traumatized the Forest
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Service and compounded the humiliation of Gifford Pinchot's dismissal earlier
in the year as a result of the celebrated Ballinger-Pinchot controversy.45
Illustrative of the fury of the 1910 fires are the events of August 21, and 22.
Along the Idaho and Montana border, west of Missoula, several separate fires
united in one great conflagration. An irregular swath 100 miles long and 40
miles wide burned in untrammeled wilderness. Firefighters found the roadless
and trailess country extremely difficult, and with the arrival of "hurricane"
winds, putting the flames out became an impossibility. The wind drove the
flames out of the wilderness and into area towns, such as Wallace, Idaho, which
was reduced to ashes.46
In the aftermath of the 1910 fires the Forest Service had to decide what to do
with the burned timber. Enormous numbers of burned trees lay in the forests of
the Northern District. These trees had to be harvested quickly before they
began to deteriorate and were useless for commercial purposes. Northern
District managers decided to push "vigorously" the sale of this burned timber.
Mills could buy the timber on the stump at greatly reduced prices; they only had
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to go and get it. This sell-off, contrary to the policy of Secretary Wilson, who
adhered to a policy of conservation of federal timber in anticipation of future
need, brought the lumberjack into the wilderness, armed with saw and axe.47
Climatically, the conditions in the summer of 1914 approximated those of
1910. A lengthy period of drought preceded the fire season of 1914 and,
combined with the usual hazards of slash burning and campfires, promised
another severe burn for the forests of western Montana. However, the fire
season of 1914 failed to approach the level of devastation in 1910. Total
acreage burned was 113,643, compared to almost three million acres consumed
in 1910. This reduced burn, in terms of acres, came as a result of more total
fires reported, 1, 975 to 1,582 in 1910 48
The Forest Service interpreted the results of the 1914 fire season as
confirmation of the efficacy of their policy of fire suppression. They cited their
rate of 82 percent of all fires held to under ten acres as proof of the feasibility
of detecting, fighting, and controlling forest fires, even in adverse natural
conditions, as in the summer of 1914, Moreover, massive efforts to control
forest fires represented good economic public policy. In 1914, the Northern
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Region spent $390,000 to protect an estimated one-hundred million dollar timber
resource threatened by the fires of that year.49
Although Elers Koch, supervisor of Lolo National Forest, characterized the fire
suppression efforts of 1914 as "splendid," he noted the necessity of moving fire
camps up close to the flames. Most fire crews had to walk great distances
through rugged terrain to arrive at the scene of a fire. Koch noted the
effectiveness of using the automobile to rush fire crews to critical points in the
fire, demonstrated at the Granite Creek fire in the Lolo Forest. Koch
undoubtedly referred to the advisability of constructing more roads, or trails, for
the express purpose of facilitating fire control.50 The district headquarters also
identified the increase in trail mileage over that in 1910, 4504 miles to 1751 in
1910, as contributory to the successful effort in limiting the destructiveness of
the 1914 fires.51
Subsequent fire seasons reinforced the conclusions drawn in 1914. A slow,
wet season in 1915 allowed firefighters to reflect on what improvements were
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necessary for optimum fire suppression. "Every fire season demonstrates the
value of trails and telephone lines," opined the 1915 fire report. Funding for
trails to "open up inaccessible country" was the district's greatest need.52
Satisfactory fire suppression depended on increased access to the backcountry,
where, irritatingly, lightning-caused fires always seemed to occur.53
Within the Forest Service, as fire suppression continued as the top priority,
there emerged a small movement that would eventually prove decisive in the
history of wilderness. Aldo Leopold and Arthur Carhart initially represented
this movement. Later, Robert Marshall came to lead this new, recreation
oriented faction. Although recognized as a legitimate use of the national forests
as early as 1905, yet, recreation ranked far below the extractive uses in priority.
The multiple use concept attempted to cater to all potential uses of public
forested land, and early in the history of the Forest Service, public interest in
outdoor activities established recreation as a use.54
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When Henry S. Graves replaced Pinchot as chief of the Forest Service in
1910, he explicitly recognized recreation as a valid use of the National Forests.
Growing public demand for outdoor recreation (with the increased access to
national forest land aided by the automobile) prompted Congress officially to
recognize recreation as an approved use of the forested lands in 1915.
However, this recognition extended primarily to utilitarian recreational uses such
as permits for summer home construction, hotels, and stores.55
In 1916, Congress established the National Park Service in the Department of
the Interior. With the creation of the Park Service, the Forest Service found a
rival agency for forested land management. Under the aggressive leadership of
Borax Soap executive Steven Mather, the Park Service sought to claim prime,
scenic national forest lands and convert them into parks.56 Earlier in the
history of the National Parks, John Muir considered wilderness values better
protected by national parks than by the Pinchot-led Forest Service. However,
Mather's vision for the parks fundamentally differed from that of Muir.57
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Mather promoted the parks to take advantage of the rising tide of the
American automobile tourist. He licensed concessionaires to provide the
amenities of home life in the scenic setting of America's most spectacular
country. Furthermore, Mather vigorously supported the construction of
highways on which tourists could speed to their favorite destination.58
Practiced in the art of bureaucratic battle, the Forest Service contested the
upstart Park Service over land transfers. Under chief, and former Northern
District forester, William B. Greeley, the Forest Service turned to the concept of
Muir's wilderness in an effort to preserve national forest land from the raider
Mather. Because of this interagency rivalry, the ideas of Forest Service
employees Arthur Carhart and Aldo Leopold saw the light of day.59
Perhaps the first person in the Forest Service to advocate a Muir-like
wilderness area was Arthur Carhart.60 A landscape architect assigned as a
recreation engineer, Carhart received instructions to survey Trappers Lake, in
Colorado's White River National Forest. As he conducted his business of
determining future summer home sites along the lake, Carhart met two hunters
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who inquired into the possibility of leaving Trappers Lake as it was, a
wilderness. Receptive to arguments for nature, Carhart agreed with the hunters,
and instead of advocating development for Trappers Lake he promoted a
recreational plan emphasizing the natural state of the lake and its vicinity.
Carhart succeeded in convincing his superiors in Denver not to develop
Trappers Lake.61
Aldo Leopold joined with Carhart in advocating a policy of non-development.
Leopold, with Thoreau and Muir, ranks as a seminal figure in the evolution of
both wilderness policy and philosophy. Leopold advanced the idea of a land
ethic and its place in the management of lands. The land ethic, a biocentric
perspective, abandoned a human centered ecology and alternatively placed
humans into the internal operations of nature.62 Humans had a responsibility
to integrate science into nature and nature could teach lessons to humans about
land management. Arbitrary management decisions made by humans without
the consideration of the natural world would fail, Leopold argued. In a passage
from Leopold's masterpiece, A Sand County Almanac, this message is clear:
61Craig
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The Cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize that
he is taking over the wolf's job of trimming the herd to fit the
range. He has not learned to think like a mountain. Hence we
have dustbowls, and rivers washing the future into the sea.63
As a forest supervisor for the Carson National Forest in New Mexico, Leopold
became alarmed by the end of the first world war of the increased road systems
into the backcountry. In 1922, when Leopold was the assistant district forester
in Albuquerque, he devised a wilderness protection plan for 500,000 acres in the
Gila National Forest. Leopold's plan excluded roads, trails, and use permits, but
allowed trails and telephone lines for fire suppression. On June 3, 1924, District
Forester Frank Pooler approved Leopold's Gila Wilderness plan.64
While Leopold and Pooler created the first official wilderness reservation in
the Forest Service, Chief Forester Greeley continued the war with the Park
Service over which agency could best manage America's remaining wildlands.
By 1926, Greeley acknowledged the need for a formal wilderness policy for the
Forest Service. Greeley understood the appeal of wilderness to the public, and
especially to big game hunters of the type that influenced Arthur Carhart.
Wilderness was a weapon that Greeley could employ to thwart the Park
Service.65
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Greeley conducted extensive opinion surveys within and outside the Forest
Service on the question of Wilderness preservation. These surveys indicated to
Greeley that generally favorable opinions regarding wilderness preservation
existed both inside and outside the Forest Service. Importantly, Greeley
dispatched assistant forester Leon F. Kneipp on a mission to inventory all the
roadless tracts of land then in existence in the national forests.66
Kneipp set a figure of 230,400 acres as the minimum qualifying size for a
roadless area. He found seventy-four areas meeting this requirement, almost
exclusively in the West. Kneipp's roadless areas totaled 55,000,000 acres,
representing one-third of the total Forest Service acreage. Kneipp's inventory
also noted that if the Forest Service carried out all current road construction
plans the roadless acreage would shrink to one-fifth of the total. Simultaneously
as Kneipp's inventory, in September 1926, Secretary of Agriculture W. M.
Jardine approved reserved wilderness as an element of the national recreation
policy of the Forest Service.67
Chief Greeley drafted, in December 1926, instructions for the western district
foresters that guided the implementation of the Forest Service's new wilderness
policy. Greeley's policy required an assessment of road construction plans and
special use permits in areas "adapted for wilderness forms." This policy
66Ibid,
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delegated to the district foresters considerable power to carry out wilderness
management in their districts. In Missoula, District One's forester, Richard
Rutledge, opposed Greeley's wilderness policy and called it a departure from
Pinchot's "greatest good for greatest number" principle. He advocated a policy
of excluding information on wilderness reservations from the public so forest
managers could freely make changes, without hindrance from the public.68
By 1929, the Forest Service promulgated the L-20 Regulations for the
management of wild lands and the term 'wilderness' changed to 'primitive' in
the new policy. The on-going interagency battle between the Forest and Park
Services influenced the issuance of the L-20 Regulations, although by 1929 the
main antagonists, William Greeley and Steven Mather, no longer headed their
respective agencies. L-20 was distinctive because of its relative flexibility in
regard to wilderness protection. Management priorities emphasized primitive
modes of transportation, habitation, and subsistence, all keyed to the highest
degree of public recreational use. L-20 also contained provisions for planning
the circumstances in which timber harvest and other extractive uses of primitive
areas could occur. Due to their lack of any real protective measures, the Forest
Service probably issued L-20 to please an unsuspecting public, and in the
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process head-off any attempt to transfer more national forest land to the Park
Service.69
While Carhart and Leopold advanced the idea of wilderness, and Greeley and
his successor, another former Northern District forester, R.Y. Stuart* directed the
war with the Park Service, fire suppression continued as the main order of
business on the northern Rockies forests such as Lolo. Road and trail
construction received both funding and attention, increasingly opening the
pristine forests of western Montana.
Replacing the recalcitrant Richard Rutledge as District Forester, in 1929, was
the Forest Service's "toughest fire officer" Evan W. Kelley.70 A veteran of
World War One's U.S. Tenth Engineers71, Major Kelley's goal was specifically
fire suppression. A particularly bad fire season in 1929 greeted the new district
forester, and lasted until November. Described as a "tough, violent," fire
season, 1929 featured the Bald Mountain Fire in the Selway National Forest,

69Allin,

74; Roth, 115; and Gilligan, 122-130. By July 1933, five roadless
tracts in Montana were managed under the L-20 Regulations: Absaroka,
Beartooth, Mission Mountains, South Fork of the Flathead River, and the
Spanish Peaks. L-20 protected no Lolo Forest areas.
70Pyne,
71Oral

256.

interview with Evan W. Kelley, conducted by Amelia Fry, University
of California, Berkeley, October 10, 1964, Oral History 240-1, 2, K. Ross Toole
Archives, University of Montana, Missoula, MT. The Tenth Engineers' mission
was forestry in cooperation with French officials. The Tenth would supply the
timber needs of the fighting forces.

34

southwest of Missoula on the Idaho side of the Bitterroot Divide. Major Kelley
termed the Bald Mountain fire a "monster," and this blaze demonstrated all the
difficulties of fighting wilderness fires, especially the difficulty of access.72
Driven by the destruction of the fire season of 1929, Major Kelley launched a
comprehensive fire policy for the Northern Region.73 This policy emphasized
both greatly expanded road and trail construction and a standard of having all
detected fires under control by 10:00 AM the day following detection- the 10:00
AM Policy. Major Kelley's road plan called for long, narrow roads into the
backcountry to facilitate the movement of fire crews in the event of another
Bald Mountain type fire. Although this was a familiar theme in the Northern
Region, Major Kelley prosecuted his fire suppression plan with the
determination of an officer leading troops to battle.
The increased pace of road construction, particularly the completion of a
gravel highway over Lolo Pass and along Idaho's Lochsa River (following the
Lewis and Clark trail), inspired a passionate critique of Forest Service policy by
former Lolo National Forest supervisor, and assistant district ranger, Elers Koch.
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After the infamy of 1910, Koch had advocated the increased construction of
roads and trails, but by the 1930's, Koch recognized the destructiveness of that
construction to the wilderness quality of the Northern Rockies' forests. He
began an article in the Journal of Forestry with the following:
The Lolo Trail is no more. The bulldozer blade has ripped out the
hoof tracks of Chief Joseph's ponies. The trail was worn deep by
centuries of Nezperce and Blackfeet Indians, by Lewis and Clark,
by companies of Northwest Company fur traders, by General
Howard's cavalry horses, by Captain Mullan, the engineer, and by
the early day forest ranger. It is gone, and in its place there is
only the print of the automobile tire in the dust.74
Koch railed against the "hammer" of the Civilian Conservation Corps, as they
dammed the waters of the wilderness of the Selway Forest, and he bemoaned
the disappearance of the forest he knew as a pioneer forest ranger in the once
vast wilderness of the northern Rocky Mountains.75
Koch announced that the Forest Service's attempt at fire suppression in the
wildernesses of the Northern Region was futile. Noting that the history of fire
suppression was one of the "saddest" in Forest Service history, Koch lamented
the expenditure of money and the sacrifice of human life involved in the
impossible task of wildfire control. "When fire gets a good start in the dry firekilled cedar and white fir . . . the whole United States Army, if on the ground,
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could do nothing but keep out of the way." Koch seemed to say to the forestry
profession that wildfire control was not a sufficient reason to degrade the last
vestiges of wild country left in the northern Rockies.76
Major Kelley promoted his fire suppression policy by referring to the necessity
of preventing epic conflagrations such as seen in 1910 and 1929. He anticipated
the completion of his "truck trail" or road system by 1934, supplemented by the
construction of strategically located airstrips in the backcountry to take
advantage of the technology of flight in the battle against the flames. Once
these improvements were in place, then Major Kelley could concentrate on
enforcing his 10:00 AM policy. He was absolutely certain that men armed with
the latest in technology, assisted by an expanded transportation network, could
defy nature's attempts to deprive humankind of valuable timber. "Verily, failure
of the future seems far less likely than in the past," he wrote.77
In 1934, Major Kelley's system received a stern test with the arrival of yet
another devastating fire season. Large numbers of lightning strikes set off many
fires, particularly in the backcountry, and burned much timber.78 Described
by a former ranger as a "martinet," Major Kelley was not pleased with the
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results of the fire fighting effort of 1934.79 In a terse memorandum to
Assistant Forester Elers Koch, Major Kelley declared the 1934 fire season as
"historical," and demanded a statement for the record of the "costly and
humiliating affair" by those (including Koch) involved.80
Despite Evan Kelley's inviolable faith in the Forest Service's ability to stamp
out commercially significant fires in the Northern Region, and his dedication to
the Pinchot principle of greatest good for the greatest number, he managed to
hold some sympathy for the continued existence of wild lands in the national
forests. Major Kelley observed in 1937 a growing demand for solitude, for
wilderness as a place to escape the rigors of everyday life. He pointed to the
creation of the L-20 primitive areas, that by 1937 also included Montana's
Selway-Bitterroot, Sun River, and Pentagon areas as examples of the Forest
Service's commitment to satisfy this demand.81
Major Kelley deplored a proposal to dam the Gallatin Canyon during an
address to a conference of Western Farm Economics Association in Bozeman,
Montana, on July 7, 1938. Citing several times that wilderness recreation was a
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legitimate use of the national forest, Major Kelley analyzed the effects of the
proposed dam project:
The dam would impound water which would be drawn to irrigate
crops for the benefit of a larger or more stable economy in the
Gallatin Valley- a worthy project in itself, but at what costs! If
this were done, the spiritual value of the scenic Gallatin Canyon,
one of nature's architectural masterpieces, would be irreparably
scarred.82
Importantly during this time, Major Kelley's thinking was influenced by Robert
Marshall, one of the most important wilderness advocates in history.83
Illustrative of Marshall's impact on Major Kelley was the cessation of one of
Kelley's prized road projects over Elk Summit in the Powell Ranger District of
Lolo National Forest.84 Marshall maintained correspondence with Major
Kelley from his office in Washington, D.C. where he served as the Forest
Service's head of the Division of Recreation and Lands. In this position,
Marshall supervised the management of the Forest Service's L-20 primitive
areas. He soon would realize the vulnerability of the primitive areas under the
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loose L-20 Regulations. One proposal from Major Kelley to allow aircraft to
ferry hunters into the South Fork of the Flathead Primitive Area elicited a
response from Marshall. He opposed "opening up" the area to planes because
of the increase in hunter pressure to the primitive area, but primarily because of
the precedent that decision would set for the management of the nation's other
..

primitive areas.

Q<

Most of Major Kelley's pronunciations on the benefits of wilderness echoed
the philosophy of Robert Marshall. Wilderness could meet human needs that
civilized society left unfulfilled. Away from the comforts of modern America,
wilderness required of people a self-sufficiency, a dependence on one's own
resources. Some people, Marshall believed, had a psychological desire for the
thrills of the woods, while others craved the psychological release, the
peacefulness of the wilderness experience. Marshall's wilderness philosophy
emphasized the critical role wild country played in a healthy, satisfied life.86
Critical to the evolution of protected wilderness was Marshall's crowning
achievement to his prematurely ended life, the issuance of the Forest Service's
U Regulations. Marshall's U Regulations evolved from his earlier participation
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in the Copeland Report, published in 1933. Marshall wrote the recreation
chapters of this report that assessed the state of the national forests and
recommended future courses of action. He proposed a classification system for
recreation areas: three of the classifications dealt with wilderness areas.
Marshall's wilderness classifications divided wilderness by size, relative
wildness, and permitted human activity.87
Later in 1933, Marshall received an appointment as Director of Forestry in the
Office of Indian Affairs. There, in addition to setting up a wilderness program
for the Indian Reservations, Marshall continued to work for the reservation of
large tracts of wilderness on all federal lands. In 1935, due to what Marshall
perceived as inadequate progress in establishing wilderness, he, Aldo Leopold,
and others founded the Wilderness Society. This organization's goals were to
raise public consciousness on wilderness issues and to pressure federal agencies
for more wilderness protection. In 1935, the Wilderness Society published its
first quarterly magazine, The Living Wilderness, with funds provided by the
millionaire Marshall.88
"The fight to save the wilderness has grown during the last ten years from the
personal hobby of a few fanatics to an important, nation-wide movement,"
Marshall wrote in the November, 1936 issue of Living Wilderness. Of
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particular concern to Marshall, were the vast roadless areas, existing primarily
on Forest Service land. Marshall, and Althea Dobbins, inventoried the nation's
roadless tracts of 300,000 acres or more. They found 48 such areas in the
national forests, eight of which were in Montana. Dobbins and Marshall's
survey substantially conformed to the earlier findings of the Kneipp inventory,
conducted in the 1920s.89

By 1937, Marshall was back in the Forest Service,

as Director of Recreation and Lands. Marshall left the Interior Department due
to what he considered the department's growing affinity for recreational
development, such as campgrounds, hotels, and concessionaires.90 As the
Forest Service's main official for wilderness areas, Marshall set out to advocate
the inclusion of more roadless areas in a protected status, and he drafted the U
Regulations. As with his Copeland Report recommendations, the U Regulations
divided wild lands into three categories. U1 authorized the chief of the Forest
Service to designate areas of not less than 100,000 acres as 'wilderness'; U2
allowed the chief to designate suitable forest lands under 100,000 acres as 'wild'
areas. Both of these categories prohibited motorized traffic, commercial timber
harvest, or permanent construction. Boundaries for these areas, once set, could
only be altered by the Secretary of Agriculture. U3 provided for the
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management of certain lands, including roadless areas, as recreation areas,
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Management plans for all three
regulations permitted grazing, and water storage construction.91
The Forest Service announced the U Regulations in September 1939. The
regulations provided for the Forest Service to examine the L-20 primitive areas
for inclusion under the U Regulations, and also allowed a ninety-day public
commentary period preceding any reclassification. Inter-agency rivalry with a
Park Service that continually proposed land transfers to its jurisdiction during
the 1930's continued to stimulate Forest Service preservation measures.
Marshall, himself, felt the pressure from the Park Service, and this undoubtedly
influenced him as he drafted the U Regulations.92 Ironically, only two months
after he witnessed the advent of the strongest protection thus far for wild
country, Robert Marshall, on his way from Washington, D.C. to a family
reunion in New York, died on November 10, 1939, of 'coronary thrombosis'93
In the aftermath of the U Regulations' promulgation, a brief period of
reclassification took place. The Pacific Northwest Region reclassified one
primitive area to wilderness, and three areas to wild areas. The Southwest
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Region reclassified three primitive areas to wild, and two to wilderness. In the
Northern Region the most significant reclassification prior to World War Two
occurred. With the signatures of Major Kelley, acting Chief Forester Earle
Clapp, and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace in August 1940, the Forest
Service established the Bob Marshall Wilderness in the Flathead and Lewis and
Clark National Forests. At nearly one-million acres, the composite of the old
South Fork of the Flathead, Sun River, and Pentagon primitive areas, constituted
the only major reclassification before the war.94
As the second world war approached, the Forest Service waited poised to
provide the natural resources essential to national defense. Lolo National Forest,
as with most Northern Region forests, retained significant tracts of wild country,
notwithstanding Major Kelley's fire suppression roads and trails. To the east of
Lolo Forest, the new expanses of the Bob Marshall Wilderness offered the
strongest guarantee yet of the continued existence of this wild country. To the
south, and including acres in the Lolo Forest, was the immense SelwayBitterroot Primitive Area that awaited reclassification under Ul.
By World War II, then, the Forest Service had created the beginnings of a
national wilderness preservation system. However, the aura of Gifford Pinchot
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and the doctrine of utilitarianism still reigned supreme in the minds of forest
managers. With the arrival of war, the Forest Service would find it natural to
shift from incipient wilderness protection to full capacity extractive activity.

CHAPTER TWO: Timber, Development, and Wilderness Preservation

World War II brought fundamental change to the management of the national
forests. Wood products were essential to the military, as the services required
wood for, among other uses, pontoon bridges, truck beds, ship decks, gun
stocks, and buildings.

The Forest Service responded to the massive increased

demand for wood products by increasing the harvest of national forest timber.
Public timber, for the first time, ranked with privately supplied timber as a
significant source of the United States' forest products consumption.95
Complicating matters, a renewed drive for recreation and wilderness
preservation occurred along with the increased demands for forest products. The
Forest Service's inability to satisfy preservationist desires led to Congress's
enactment of the Wilderness Act in 1964.
Although, by the mid-1920s, timber receipts exceeded those from grazing as
the Forest Service's principal source of income, the annual harvest did not
approach the potential timber yield. Wilderness conditions and large tracts of
roadless, substantially pristine, land existed in many regions, especially in the
northern Rocky Mountains. Before the exigencies of global warfare, the
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resources contained in these wilderness enclaves were in slight demand.
Privately owned resources more than adequately quenched America's thirst for
raw materials.96
Wartime requirements for national forest timber disrupted the reclassification
efforts for the primitive areas. Attention shifted to economic concerns and the
supply of vital resources needed for the war effort.97 During wartime,
Americans focused on the task of fighting a major two-front war and supplying
the bulk of the Allied Powers' resource requirements. In such an atmosphere,
people afforded wilderness policy little attention. The war removed two of the
necessary factors that contributed to wilderness preservation appreciation:
economic abundance and prodigious leisure time. Wilderness advocates' pleas
for resource preservation, during a time of increasing demands, would appear
unpatriotic and perhaps subversive. World War II cast a perception of
unacceptability over any effort viewed to impair the nation's capability for
•

QO

victory.
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Administrative protection of wild areas commanded a low priority compared to
the war effort. A 1940 letter to forest supervisors requested that all primitive
area developments, prohibited by the U Regulations, be cleared by the Secretary
of Agriculture. Nevertheless, under pressure to supply resources, forest
supervisors allowed developments without approval." This demonstration of
the flexibility of administrative wild land protection, coupled with future
transgressions, eventually would reignite wilderness advocates into a drive for
statutory protection.
The Lolo National Forest reflected national trends during the war. Timber
harvest occupied a much higher priority and soon represented the greatest threat
to the continued existence of substantial tracts of wild lands. The increased
pace of logging challenged the Forest Service's concept of sustained yield
forestry. As Major Kelley noted in 1944, "Wartime demands have made it
necessary to cut on some forests faster than the timber is growing." Still,
Kelley looked forward to a return to a sustainable harvest when possible after
the end of hostilities.100
In 1944, the forests of the Northern Region harvested three- and-a-half times
as much timber as the ten-year pre-war average, or 320,058,000 million board
"Gilligan, 205, Appendix D.
100United
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feet (MMBF). Military requirements consumed 300,000,000 MMBF of the
1944 harvest. Axel Lindh, Chief of Timber Management for the Northern
Region, explained that the increased harvest resulted from a shift from private to
public timber. The private industrial lands were either "running out," or were
held in reserve for future harvest.101
For decades private foresters had practiced 'cut-and-run' forestry. They cut
off all the valuable commercial species- white pine and ponderosa- without
reseeding their lands to ensure future growth. At sites in the Pacific Northwest
they employed clear cutting tactics (the removal of all timber from a given piece
of land), and once they expended their timber, they sold their property. The
consequences of these actions placed the demand of supplying the wartime
lumber needs increasingly on the public's forests.102
Major Kelley hoped that the end of the war, and its demands for forest
products, would allow for a reduction of the harvests on the national forests.
To the contrary however, the housing boom generated by returning GIs after
the end of the war brought ever increasing harvests.

Besides the pressures of

increased logging, there were other demands on the National Forests and their
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wildernesses. The most significant of these was the post-war boom in outdoor
recreation.

Significantly, with the end of war, and in the climate of increased

development in the national forests, wilderness advocacy returned to life.
Wilderness proponents, such as Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society,
viewed with alarm the ever increasing timber harvests, and the associated road
networks necessary to support timber sales. Timber sales began a steady
increase after a drop in board feet harvested in the last quarter of 1945 (8
MMBF less than the last quarter of 1944), and a lower harvest in 1946.103
Contributory to an increased harvest in the national forests was a growing
appreciation for species of timber that were previously dismissed in favor of the
standard sawlog species, ponderosa and white pine. Two of the more popular
new sawlog species were lodgepole pine and western larch. P.D. Hanson, who
replaced Evan Kelley as Region One Forester in May 1944, announced on
February 27, 1946 the sale of 4,200 acres of lodgepole pine, located in the
Lewis and Clark National Forest near White Sulphur Springs, Montana, to a
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Milwaukee, Wisconsin firm. Hanson noted that the sale marked "a turning point
in the forest economy in Montana." Hanson recognized that the commercial
attractiveness of lodgepole pine, for uses such as power poles, fence posts,
pulpwood, and even as sawlogs, would hasten the development of many
Montana forests, especially in the eastern part of the state where three million
acres of untouched lodgepole stood.104
More significant to more humid forests such as Lolo National Forest, was the
popularity of western larch as a commercial species. As with lodgepole pine,
the wood products industry had dismissed larch as a species conducive to
primary uses such as construction. During World War II and after, the harvest
of larch for sawtimber steadily increased. In 1945, larch comprised 21.9% of
the total Northern Region cut, compared to the more popular ponderosa species
that totaled 28.7% of the cut. The rise of larch was best illustrated against the
decline of the staple species, white pine. In 1940, white pine accounted for
60.7% of all sawlogs harvested in Region One. By 1945, the white pine share
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was a meager 13.2%. White pine became too scarce and expensive to harvest
when Montana had such abundant stands of larch.105
In the first quarter of 1946, timber sales more than doubled over the same
period of 1945. Timber managers interpreted this increase as an indication that
national forest timber would play a critical role in the already apparent post-war
housing boom. Despite the first quarter increase, the 1946 federal harvest in
Montana forests declined from 1945 (this decline was compensated by a 100plus MMBF increase in the private harvest). However, beginning in 1947 the
harvests from the Montana forests (except for the year 1950) steadily increased,
most spectacularly in the early to mid-1950s.106 Opening up backcountry was
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now of paramount importance, and in April 1946, Northern Region actively
recruited road building crews. P.D. Hanson announced, "We anticipate funds
for a greatly expanded road building program on the national forests."107
Congress, in 1946, appropriated seven million dollars for timber access road
construction.108 Demonstrating the reason for this construction, the National
Housing Agency supplemented these funds. Chief Lyle Watts reported that road
construction was the top priority "in view of the critical lumber shortage."
Watts disclosed that the Forest Service plans called for 138,167 miles of
secondary or development roads. As of the close of 1946, 46,976 miles were of
unsatisfactory standard, and 37,753 miles remained for construction.109

Montana National Forest Harvest, 1945-1956.
Source: The University of Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic
Research, Missoula, MT, 59812.
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Forest roads served as transportation conduits as well as providing access for
timber harvest. With the end of the war, general traffic exceeded the pre-war
total and this situation furthered the continuous Forest Service calls for increased
road funding.110 In 1947, the Engineering Division of the Forest Service
occupied itself with construction and maintenance of timber access roads instead
of the Forest Highway System construction, which was urgently needed due to
the system's deterioration during the war.111
Pressures to supply sawtimber mounted as the 1940s progressed. Yet, funds
for access roads into the pristine stands of Douglas-fir and western larch, which
by 1948 accounted for 48% of Northern Region's harvest of sawtimber, were
meager. While the timber managers called for over 30,000 miles of new roads
in 1948 engineers constructed only 1,100 miles of new roads. Frustratingly for
the Forest Service, the majority of the road appropriations went to maintenance
of existing roads.112
When maintenance requirements consumed the bulk of the roads appropriation
in 1949, Chief Lyle Watts vented his pique in his annual report. He called the
new construction funding, "wholly inadequate to meet the urgent needs for log-
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hauling roads and other forest traffic facilities."

Watts estimated the cost to

open up the "remaining large stands of national forest timber" at $100,000,000
over five years. The lack of roads, according to Watts was "hampering forest
management, and millions of board feet of timber are being lost each year
through insects, disease, and rot, that might otherwise be salvaged."113
The early 1950s witnessed a greatly expanded national forest timber harvest in
the Northern Region. Despite road funding inadequacies, Montana forests
supplied impressive sums of timber. Characteristic of the times, in May 1951,
P.D. Hanson announced that Region One was putting 188,500,000 MMBF up
for sale.
Especially enticing to potential bidders was 100,000,000 MMBF of western
white pine, "the king of the softwood species" included in the sale. Hanson
described the timber as "overmature" and "decadent," and it was located in
undeveloped portions of Lolo and Clearwater National Forests. The Forest
Service promised to construct a main access road to the general area of the
timber. The buyer was responsible for constructing 40 miles of main haul
access road and "several" hundred miles of secondary and spur roads.114
113Annual
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This sale is typical of the Forest Service's shifting emphasis on timber
management. The policy now specified the development of all suitable timber
areas as rapidly as possible. Development projects had to be large to amortize
the investment in road construction; since Congress inadequately funded road
construction, needed roads for timber production would be financed through the
timber sale.115 To get around the shortage of road building funds, the
proceeds from the Lolo-Clearwater timber would underwrite the main access
road. This road could be used in the future to facilitate additional timber sales
of overmature stands of prime commercial timber such as white pine. Most
importantly, the new road would allow for the permanent, sustained yield timber
management of former unproductive wilderness.116
The Northern Region took pains to point out the importance of Forest Service
road projects. As late as the early 1950s the major north-south and east-west
transportation corridors were Forest Service highway system roads. These roads
were vital to commerce in an age that relied increasingly on motor
transportation of goods to support a rapidly expanding national economy. In
1952, a Northern Region press release lectured;
The products of mines, forests and ranches are the raw materials of
Montana's industry. Our highways are a part of our industrial
"interview with John Milodragovich, retired Forest Service official, March
22, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.
116Ibid.
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plant. They carry the goods and the people. They are big cogs in
the machine that makes the payrolls. The fishermen, the tourists,
the logging truck drivers, the businessmen on their way over
Highway 10 [present-day Interstate 90] want to know 'how's the
road?' 'If its good, OK. If it's bad, it's bad for business.' How's
the road?- depends on the money to build it and to rebuild it to
modern standards.117
By 1955 Northern Region forests reached a post-war timber production plateau
and harvests leveled out until the mid-1960s when another production boom
occurred. The 1955 Annual Report for Lolo National Forest is representative of
the management situation during the mid-1950s. In this report, Supervisor
Edward F. Barry applauded a record timber harvest for 1955, at 108 million
board feet. However, Barry raised familiar complaints about the lack of access
roads hampering a full utilization of Lolo Forest's resources, he wrote, "Good
roads are essential for reaping the full harvest of wood that the forest can
produce."118
Barry noted that Missoula's sawmilling capacity far exceeded Lolo Forest's
allowable cut. Missoula's sawmilling industry grew "tremendously" in the post
war era. This growth was fed by ever-increasing harvests of public timber, and
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by a continuous, but perceived dwindling, supply of private timber that averaged
223,110,000 MMBF per year for the state of Montana in the post-war years,
1945-1956.119

Barry warned that as the private lands were "cut over" the

local lumber industry would become more dependent on public timber. Industry
stability, founded on the full productive use of "all forest land," was Lolo
National Forest's objective, according to Supervisor Barry.120
Gifford Pinchot's vision for the Forest Service consisted of a decentralized
agency that was responsive to local concerns. In the pre-World War II days, the
agency lived up to this vision. With the post-war housing boom and the
consequent demands for public timber, the Washington office, through its
Division of Timber Management, increasingly attempted to influence field
operations.121 The shift of emphasis to timber management in effect
centralized decision making in the Forest Service.
Yearly increases in harvest, despite road shortages, characterized the Forest
Service's new timber orientation. By 1947, the Forest Service was beginning to
see its prime objective as growing, selling, and harvesting timber crops. Timber
management occupied increasing amounts of agency time and effort. By 1952,
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timber had such a firm grip on the agency that young foresters knew that timber
management was the vehicle for professional advancement.122
Complicating the management plans of the Forest Service in the post-war
years was the explosion of outdoor recreation.123 After years of economic
depression and war, by the late 1940s Americans took to the woods in
unprecedented numbers. The National Park Service bore the brunt of this
recreation 'invasion', but the national forests, too, experienced a marked
upswing in visitors. Increasingly these visitors arrived via the automobile, and
they required facilities.124
Recreation pressures mounted in Northern Region's forests as well. The
greatest recreational use occurred in the areas of easy access, roaded areas, but
the remote wilderness areas experienced increased visitation as well. In 1947
the region witnessed a 30% increase in sport fishing over 1946. Big game
hunting also increased in popularity and the 1947 hunting seasons reported
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122,000 hunters "bagging" 10,200 elk, 1,300 black bears, 11,000 mule deer,
5,000 whitetail deer, and 46 grizzlies.125
As in the Superior Roadless Area, the Northern Region experienced trouble
with pilots landing their planes in the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Pilots landed
on Forest Service airstrips located in the wilderness for fire suppression
purposes, and they also landed hydroplanes on pristine lakes such as Big
Salmon. Regulation U1 prohibited unauthorized planes from landing in the
wilderness, and on July 22, 1949, Assistant Regional Forester for Recreation and
Lands, R.U. Harmon, announced that violators of the regulation would be
prosecuted.126
Interestingly, the Forest Service periodically would actively promote the
virtues of their wilderness areas as hunting grounds. A 1950 press release
solicited more hunting pressure on the elk herds of the Selway-Bitterroot
Primitive Area. Touting over "a million acres of good hunting territory," the

125"Hunting

and Fishing Increases in Region One in 1947," United States
Department of Agriculture, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1,1017,
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT.
126"Airplanes

prohibited in Wilderness Areas," United States Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1043,
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT.

60

Forest Service advertised a success rate of 90% to those hunters intrepid enough
to pack-in after snowstorms had driven the herds to the lower river valleys.127
Wilderness areas became increasingly popular with elk hunters. In the
expansive wildernesses of the Northern Region, such as the Bob Marshall and
the Selway-Bitterroot, large herds of elk grew as a result of abundant forage
created by the fires of 1910, 1919, 1929, and 1934. Former Northern Region
wilderness specialist Ed Slusher remembers elk were so plentiful that "even
inexperienced hunters were often successful."128
By the mid-1950s, with timber production at record levels, recreational use
also dramatically increased. Improving access, as engineers made progress in
the struggle to carve roads into the backcountry, facilitated visitors' journeys to
national forest attractions. These attractions included picnic areas, campgrounds,
ski areas, hotels, resorts, scenic roads, and the various categories of wilderness.
In 1955, 45,712,868 people visited the national forests nationwide. By 1956,
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this figure rose to 52,556,084, with a total of 131 million travelling the forest
highway system.129
While they facilitated access, timber, road, and recreation developments posed
a threat to wild lands that the public could readily see, and increasingly
lamented. However, the 1950s brought another, more sinister and often
invisible, degradation to the wild quality of the nation's forests- the use of
pesticides. Timber managers observed with alarm the devastating impact an
insect infestation had on commercial timber. Making the problem most acute
was the ceaseless demand for timber to feed the ever hungry mills that turned
out wood products to support the creation of suburban America in the post-war
era. Timber managers learned to appreciate the effects of a chemical called
DDT in controlling insect caused tree destruction.130
Ten years before Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring, informed the public on
the hazards of DDT, G.M. Brandborg Supervisor of the Bitterroot National
Forest, announced the spraying of 12,000 acres of Douglas-fir and spruce along
the East Fork of the Bitterroot River. The spray consisted of one pound of
DDT per one gallon of fuel oil, and airplanes delivered this concoction at the
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rate of one gallon per acre. DDT had proven effective as a controlling agent for
the spruce budworm, an insect that threatened large stands of commercial
timber.131 This was the first use of aerially delivered DDT in Montana
history.132
In Lolo National Forest, 1954 witnessed an "epidemic" of spruce budworm in
the Bonita and Powell Ranger Districts. The Annual Report for 1955 disclosed
that 102,000 acres of the Powell Ranger District were scheduled for spraying
with DDT in 1956.133 Former Powell District Ranger William R. 'Bud'
Moore remembered the spraying as the most traumatic time of his Forest
Service career. When Moore received notification that Regional Headquarters
planned to spray his district, he was immediately concerned. Moore questioned
the chemical's safety, but was reassured that DDT posed no threat to the pristine
nature of the Powell District.134

131The

spruce budworm feeds on the new growth of trees. Successive years
of spruce budworm induced defoliation causes the tree to die, or so weakens it
that it becomes vulnerable to other insects.
132Rachel

Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962; "Aerial
Spraying Completed on Bitterroot," United States Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release, #R-1, 1109, July 12, 1952,
Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT. Historians credit Carson for identifying the dangers of DDT to
both humans and nature. Prior to Silent Spring people thought DDT was an
"environmental wonder drug." Nash, 252, see also: Clary, 178.
133"Aerial

Spraying Completed on Bitterroot," 6.

134Interview

with William R. Moore, January 7, 1993, Condon, MT, notes.

63

Timber production concerns created great pressure to spray DDT, proven
effective to kill the spruce budworm. The epidemic had to be limited to as few
acres as possible, and the questioning of one district ranger about possible sideeffects on non-targeted organisms could not interfere with the health of a forest
that contained resources in much demand. In 1956 airplanes from Missoula
sprayed DDT on the Powell Ranger District. Moore noticed the results
"immediately" after spraying. The formerly untrammeled Haskell Creek was
"jam-packed with dead frogs" and trout were found "belly-up." Moore called
the spruce budworm eradication effort a "disaster."135
Nevertheless, the Forest Service placed unshakable faith in technology and
chemicals. Science could indeed force nature to bend to the will of humans;
spruce budworms would not be permitted to alter the planned harvest of timber.
Bud Moore, outraged at what he found on Haskell Creek, called Lolo Forest
Supervisor Ed Barry to report his findings. Barry replied, "You can't prove it
was the spray that killed the fish." The Forest Service was so assured of DDT's
safety that one ranger even ordered a ranger station building sprayed. A career
Forest Service employee, Bud Moore began to question the effectiveness of his
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superiors as good land managers in the wake of the DDT assault on the
wilderness of the Idaho Lochsa River country.136
Another insect that had extensive land management implications was the
spruce bark beetle. In 1949, high winds caused a massive blowdown of timber
in the northern Rockies, and out of this grounded timber grew a spruce bark
beetle infestation. This infestation is significant because of the Forest Service's
response to this natural calamity. They harvested the killed and infected spruce,
with a timber management tactic known as clearcutting.137
Except for Douglas-fir in the Pacific Northwest, clearcutting (the removal of
all timber from a given piece of land) was uncommon in the nation's public
forests before the post-war boom. In the late 1940s the forest administrators of
the Pacific Northwest began planning clearcut harvests and by 1949, the idea
spread to the Northern Rockies. Clearcutting had scientific and economic
grounding. Foresters pointed out that some shade-intolerant species could have
growth enhanced by clearcuts that opened space in which to grow. Lodgepole
pine was a particular target for clearcutting as managers found lodgepole
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vulnerable to wind after selective cutting, and suitable to even-aged
management.1
Timber affected by the spruce bark beetle contributed to the increased harvests
in Montana in the early to mid 1950s. Clearcuts of infected timber began along
the North Fork of the Flathead River in the Flathead National Forest.
Sometimes, rangers would "sweeten" beetle-killed timber sales with an adjacent
swath of healthy "green" timber.139 Bud Moore conducted sales of beetle
killed timber (clearcutting was the specified method of harvest) in the Powell
District of Lolo Forest, at the top of Lolo Pass. These cuts contained no green
sweeteners. "We were too busy getting out the killed timber" to worry about
selling green timber, he remembered.140
The cumulative effects of the insect eradication efforts caused a further
degradation of the wild lands of Montana. Streams were poisoned and new
roads led to clearcuts to rid the timber base of detrimental insects. Freed by this
matrix, Northern Region foresters completed a transformation from custodians of
the land to manipulators of the land. As the clearcuts grew, the image of the
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forest ranger in a white stetson hat changed to a picture of a person in a hard
hat.141
As the Forest Service directed its attention toward producing timber and
managing expanding recreational use, the wilderness movement watched,
eagerly, for the agency to begin reclassification of the remaining L-20 primitive
areas under the U Regulations. As during the wartime period however, the
post-war timber orientation tended to overshadow any sentiment for
reclassification. At the time of James Gilligan's influential doctoral dissertation
on wilderness at the University of Michigan in 1954, Montana's one-million
acre Bob Marshall Wilderness represented the Forest Service's only
reclassification of a large U1 area. Major tracts in Wyoming, Idaho, and even
Aldo Leopold's Gila Wilderness in Arizona, awaited reclassification.142
The Forest Service reclassified some smaller U2 Wild Areas, and in Northern
Region, on June 10, 1947, created the Gates of the Mountains Wild Area, The
area contained 28,562 acres along the Missouri River between Great Falls and
Helena, Montana.143 However, more numerous than new wilderness
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designations were acreage changes within existing wildernesses. In Leopold's
Gila, the acreage had shrunk by a third. Timber supply was a major cause for
boundary adjustments, as the Forest Service substituted 'rocks and ice' acres for
lower elevation timbered slopes. Sometimes these land exchanges resulted in
spectacular acreage losses in the primitive areas. In Wyoming's North and
South Absaroka primitive areas, the Forest Service in 1951 reclassified the areas
to wilderness and the process eliminated 113,000 acres, to allow for timber
harvest and mining.144
The best known Forest Service abuse in the slow reclassification process was
the deletion of 55,620 acres from Oregon's Three Sisters Primitive Area in
1954. Three Sisters comprised 246,728 acres in the Willamette and Deschutes
National Forests. The controversy arose over the proposed elimination of the
western section of the primitive area, including a timbered valley containing a
creek from the reclassified U1 wilderness area. Local opposition came from the
Save the Three Sisters Wilderness Association, and nationally the Wilderness
Society protested to Chief Forester Richard McArdle, who had replaced Lyle
Watts in 1952.145
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In a portent of future patterns within the environmental movement, the
mainstream 'conservation' groups supported a plan that allowed the Forest
Service to delete 43,220 acres from Three Sisters, but protected the vital
timbered creek valley. The local Save the Three Sisters Wilderness Association,
however opposed all Forest Service reductions. United States Senators Richard
L. Nueberger and Wayne Morse joined with the conservation groups in a call
for the Forest Service to reconsider its reclassification plans.146
Despite the opposition of most of the Oregon congressional delegation, and
testimony on the deletion's adverse effects for the Three Sisters Wilderness
from many respected wilderness leaders (including the Wilderness Society's
Howard Zahniser and former Forest Service Chief Lyle Watts, representing the
Isaak Walton League), the Forest Service on February 8, 1957 formally deleted
53,380 acres, including the timbered creek valley.147

If the Forest Service

'won' the Three Sisters controversy, then it was a Pyrrhic victory since the
controversy demonstrated the vulnerability of administratively protected
wilderness. Reclassification acreage deletions enhanced the distrust felt by
preservationists for the Forest Service's commitment to wilderness in the face of
skyrocketing demand for timber. Adding to the groundswell of heightened
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environmental awareness was the preservationists' victory in Utah/Colorado's
Echo Park battle. In April 1950, Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman
proposed the construction of two dams in Colorado and Utah's Dinosaur
National Monument to impound the Green River. The dams, Split Mountain
and Echo Park, threatened the primeval beauty of the Green River and an
National Park Service National Monument, Dinosaur Monument.148 The
proposal drew immediate opposition from not only the Wilderness Society and
other conservation groups, but also from Major General Ulysses S. Grant III.
General Grant, retired from 43 years of service in the Army Corps of Engineers,
lent the opposition the credibility of a professional viewpoint.149

General

Grant emphasized that the two dams were not necessary for successful and
economic development of the Upper Colorado Basin. With the certainty of an
engineer, Grant argued that better locations existed that would supply more
water storage and hydraulic power without destroying rare natural beauty. Grant
warned that if the dams were constructed, they would set a dangerous precedent
for the development of other congressionally protected sites and injure the entire
country and "future generations not here to defend their heritage."150
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The decision to dam Dinosaur National Monument was Congress's to make.
Debate dragged on for years, with legislation introduced to construct a series of
dams along the Colorado River, Echo Park now the main offending proposal.
From January 18 to 28, 1954, General Grant testified, as President of the
American Planning and Civic Association, against the inclusion of Echo Park in
the system. Grant proposed an alternative series of dams that left Dinosaur
Monument inviolate. Grant suggested the construction of dams at Flaming
Gorge, Cross Mountain, Whitewater, and Glen Canyon, instead of at Echo Park,
and Navajo, as recommended by the Department of the Interior.151
The Battle to save Dinosaur National Monument united the major national
conservation groups into an Echo Park 'Coalition'. The Executive Committee
of the Council of Conservationists, a task force representing conservation
interests in the Echo Park controversy, featured a line-up of the giants of the
conservation movement, such as Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society and
David Brower of the Sierra Club. United conservation opposition, expert
witnesses such as General Grant, and an unparalleled public opinion campaign
finally were enough to save Dinosaur Monument.152
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A bill authorizing the construction of the Echo Park Dam arrived on the floor
of the Senate in April 1955. Senator Richard L. Neuberger offered an
amendment that eliminated Echo Park from the bill, but he faced a near
unanimous vote; of opposition from the western delegations.1-3 The Senate
passed the bill with Echo Park included. The House however, with Montana
Representative Lee Metcalf playing a key role, passed a bill in July 1955
without the Echo Park Dam. The final showdown on Echo Park occurred in the
conference committee in 1956, with Howard Zahniser's Wilderness Society in
the lead opposition role. A compromise was reached, similar to General Grant's
proposal, that excluded the Echo Park dam. Importantly, the new law included
a provision that prohibited the construction of a dam within any part of a
national park or monument because of the new dam authorization. Dinosaur
had been preserved, and the conservation movement "had its finest hour to
date."154
The success of the conservationists in the Dinosaur controversy, plus the Three
Sister's reclassification battle, gave rise to proposals for permanently protected
wilderness. Howard Zahniser advocated a wilderness protection system as early
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as the late 1940s, and now, on the heels of victory at Dinosaur, statutory
wilderness seemed an idea that was right for the times.155
Lifted by the Echo Park victory, Howard Zahniser drafted a four page plan for
a national wilderness preservation system. Zahniser circulated his draft among
his friends and associates, including Bob Marshall's brother, George. Zahniser
had three goals for his wilderness plan: first, he wanted a clear piece of
legislation, free from ambiguity and loopholes; second, he wanted to maintain
the successful Echo Park Coalition; and finally and perhaps most important, he
wanted to minimize the opposition.156
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Richard Neuberger of
Oregon introduced Zahniser's wilderness bill into the Senate and Representative
John Saylor of Pennsylvania introduced it in the House during the Eighty-fourth
Congress in 1956. The bill's legislative history, requiring more time and effort
than any other piece of conservation legislation in U.S. history, was a process of
obtaining support for wilderness preservation and responding to the opposing
forces with a series of compromises.157
Grazers, miners, and water users comprised the opposition to the wilderness
bill. Grazing had a long, profitable history in the national forests. Zahniser had
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opposed grazing in wilderness areas, calling it a "non-conforming use," and in
his first draft of the wilderness bill he included this language. By 1957,
however, the wilderness bill was amended to allow for grazing under the
guidance of the Secretary of Agriculture. Some stockmen continued to oppose
the bill because of its restrictions on motor vehicle use and motor
equipment.1
Mining interests opposed the wilderness bill because they feared restrictions on
their long-enjoyed tradition of free entry on the public lands. In his first draft,
Zahniser prohibited mining from the wilderness areas. The Forest Service
prodded the bill's sponsors to compromise on allowing mining, like they
compromised to allow for water projects to placate water use opposition in the
wilderness areas. Provisions for the continuation of mining in wilderness areas
contributed to the inordinate delay in passing the legislation.159
Another contributory factor in delaying passage of the wilderness bill was the
insistence of Colorado's Wayne Aspinall, Chairman of the House Committee on
Insular Affairs and one of the key supporters of the Echo Park dam, on
providing for congressional affirmative action in the designation of wilderness
areas. Aspinall engineered a compromise, designed to silence the mining
158Ibid,
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opposition, by which mining claims could be staked in wilderness areas until
January 1, 1984. Aspinall also, in 1963, reached a compromise with President
John F. Kennedy on the issue of congressional affirmative action. Congress
could designate wilderness areas in exchange for a provision directing the
review of the Forest Service's L-20 primitive areas for possible inclusion into
the wilderness system.160
Howard Zahniser poured all his energy into the fight to pass the wilderness
bill. He attended every hearing, including the field hearings conducted in
western states. Zahniser made a final appearance on behalf of the wilderness
bill on April 28, 1964, and a week later he was dead at the age of fifty-eight,
several months away from seeing his labors result in President Lyndon
Johnson's signing the Wilderness Act into law on September 3, 1964.161
The Forest Service's original stand was to oppose the idea of statutory
wilderness. When Howard Zahniser approached the Forest Service in 1956 with
his proposal for a wilderness system, the agency tried to talk him out of going
forward with his idea. Chief Forester Richard McArdle remembered the Forest
Service attitude as one of questioning the need for statutory protection.
McArdle plainly did not care for many of the proposals in the first drafts of the
legislation, such as the creation of a wilderness preservation council, invested
160Ibid,
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with no significant powers. As the bill went through its many transformations
and compromises, the Forest Service gradually, if somewhat reluctantly, came to
support the bill once Congress provided it with statutory recognition of multiple
useW.%v;,>

^

Described as one of conservation's strongest and most idealistic laws, the
Wilderness Act designated 9.1 million acres of 'instant' wilderness.163 Instant
wildernesses were those areas managed as Forest Service U1 Regulation
wildernesses. In the vicinity of Missoula, the Bob Marshall Wilderness and the
recently (in 1963) reclassified Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness instantly passed to
statutory control.164
The purpose of the Wilderness Act was to ensure that "an increasing
population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization,
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does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States."165
Importantly, the statute provided a definition of what constituted wilderness:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area
where the earth and community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of
wilderness is further defined to mean in this Act an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and
influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation,
which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural
conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has
at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to
make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired
condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.166
Once committed to the passage of the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service
interpreted the act as an endorsement of the wilderness management principles
developed within the Forest Service. The Wilderness Act directed the Forest
Service to study the remaining 5.4 million acres of L-20 primitive areas for their
suitability or non-suitability for inclusion in the National Wilderness
Preservation System.167 Significantly, the Wilderness Act failed, with any
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certainty, to specify the disposition of the remaining roadless areas located in
the national forests, millions of acres of which were, in effect, 'de-facto'
wildernesses.
Instead of 'solving' the problem of wilderness preservation, the Wilderness
Act gave rise to an epic clash of land use interests in the succeeding decades.
The 1960s would witness the final transformation of the public perception of the
Forest Service as wise managers with a monopoly on forest management
wisdom to an agency driven by a need to retain a feudal control over its domain
of national forests. The wilderness movement, buoyed by statutory authority,
would gain momentum and aggressively press the Forest Service to include
wilderness preservation as a true multiple use of the forests.

CHAPTER THREE: Multiple Use and Wildlands Controversy

As preservationists pushed statutory wilderness protection during the late
1950s and early 1960s, the Forest Service sought a statutory clarification of their
multiple use mission. Ironically, after Congress provided both statutory
wilderness and multiple use guidance, a growing conflict between the two
management concepts evolved as the 1960s progressed. By the end of the
decade, the Forest Service faced severe challenges to their professed multiple
use management practices, from not just environmentalists, but also from fellow
foresters, both inside and outside of the Forest Service.168
The pace of post-war forest development quickened during
the 1950s and the Forest Service sought to balance competing forest uses.
Recreation, feeding on the prosperity of the fifties, emerged as a major function
of the national forests. Initially perceived by the Forest Service as one type of
recreation, wilderness posed a threat to the Forest Service's multiple-use
doctrine. Mid-way in the lengthy legislative battle over statutory wilderness,
Congress gave the Forest Service official legal recognition of its long-time
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multiple-use management direction. The enactment of the Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act in 1960, enabled the Forest Service to drop its opposition to
the Wilderness Act.169
Besides the enlarged demands of recreationists, other factors contributed to the
Forest Service's desire for statutory clarification of its mission. Timber industry
representatives maintained a constant pressure for ever increased harvests from
the national forests. During the 1950s, when multiple use legislation first
commanded official interest, the relationship between the Forest Service and the
timber industry began to change. No longer did the Forest Service chastise
industry for poor timber management practices, and the timber industry began to
adopt a position on multiple use consistent with the Forest Service. This
position emphasized material production.170
Again, the National Park Service influenced Forest Service policy by actively
campaigning for more land transfers. Park Service "marauders" promoted public
discontent with the management policies of the Forest Service.171 Caught in
the middle between the timber industry's demand for more timber and the
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recreationists' expanding presence, and exacerbated by the shenanigans of the
Park Service, the Forest Service conceived of a way to moderate the competing
•

17?

interests.

The Forest Service wrote the Multiple use bill and lobbied for its passage,
with Assistant Chief Edward P. Cliff acting as the chief spokesman.173
President Dwight Eisenhower signed the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act into
law on June 12, I960.174 The act specified the multiple uses of the national
forests as: outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish.175 Included in the act was a definition of multiple use:
'Multiple use' means the management of all the various renewable
resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people;
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these
resources or related services over areas large enough to provide
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for
less than all of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated
management of the various resources, each with the other, without
impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not
necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output.176
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Wilderness, while not specifically named a use in the act, received statutory
recognition by the insertion of the line: "The establishment and maintenance of
areas of wilderness are consistent with purposes and provisions of this Act."177
This insertion placated most of the wilderness community, or Echo Park
Coalition, and made possible their support of the act. The notable dissenters
within the Echo Park Coalition were David Brower and the Sierra Club, who
thought passage of the Multiple Use bill threatened the progress of the stalled
wilderness legislation that was then in Congress.178
The Sierra Club pointed to the Act's deficiency in providing statutory
standards for multiple use. The bill offered only two guidelines for setting
priorities: first, managers need not produce every good or service on every acre;
and second, economic maximization was not the sole criterion for the evaluation
of competing interests. The Club worried that the Forest Service managers had
almost absolute and unreviewable authority to make forest management policy
under the act. The Forest Service, predisposed to timber production according
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to the Sierra Club, was unqualified to balance the competing interests in the
national forests.179
Significantly, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act passed Congress as an
amendment to the old 1897 Organic Act. The Organic Act listed only two uses
of the nation's forested reserves, timber and watershed. The 1960 Act
mentioned nothing about priority of uses, and despite protestations to the
contrary, the Forest Service would see little in the new legislation that
prohibited their Pinchot-inspired bias toward timber production, often at the
expense of the other uses. Chief Richard McArdle looked to the legislation as a
grand mandate for the management of the nation's forests for years to come.
Instead, the 1960s would bring challenges of a ferocity not seen before in the
Forest Service.180
The necessity to balance competing interests for the use of the national forests
was apparent in the forests of western Montana. Regional Forester Boyd L.
Rasmussen reported in May 1961, that recreation visits to the sixteen forests of
Region one jumped from 3,320,000 in 1959 to 5,580,000 in 1960. "All signs
indicate that we are on the threshold of a terrific upsurge in outdoor recreation,"
Rasmussen predicted. The increase in recreation visits stemmed from rising
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national population, faster modes of travel, more leisure time, and a growing
interest in outdoor recreation.181
By 1963, recreation visits topped the eight million mark in the Northern
Region. The bulk of the visitors came in the summer months, drawn to the
forests to pursue hiking, camping, fishing, swimming, horse riding, boating,
mountain climbing, and picnicking. In the fall, hunters turned to the forests to
stalk game, and in the winter 300,000 winter sports enthusiasts used the region's
sixteen winter sports sites. To handle the droves of recreationists, the region
constructed 800 new family campsites in the forests. Total regional campsites
now numbered more than 4,000, in addition to 52 boat-launching sites, 18
improved beaches, 23 organizational camps, and 52 resorts located in Northern
Region at the end of 1963. Wilderness visitation made an increased
contribution to the growing tourist industry. By 1964, 3.1 million acres in
Region One were administered as wilderness.182
181"Visits
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On top of the explosion in recreation, the Northern Region harvested record
volumes of timber during the 1960s.183

Regional Forester Neal M. Rahm, in

1963, explained the booming harvests as "approximately equivalent" to the
region's annual allowable cut.184 Rahm also described the relationship
between the Forest Service and the timber industry:
In managing the timber on the National Forests to produce a
sustained yield, the Forest Service is playing an important role in
stabilizing the supply of timber and other wood products. The
183
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timber industry is an essential partner in the management of
National forest timber lands. Without them, management could
not be obtained.185
Statistics for road construction within the Northern Region in 1963 reveal the
dominance of timber under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. Forest
Service engineers built 1,600 miles of roads and 57 miles of trails in region
forests. Of the total construction, 700 miles of roads supported timber sales,
while an additional 960 miles were for future timber access. All-purpose and
recreational roads (roads expressly for access to picnic and camp sites)
comprised a paltry 66 miles of construction.186
The drive to produce timber in record amounts highlighted other management
problems in the forests, such as insects and disease. In 1963 3.2 million acres
out of a total of 36 million had active insect outbreaks.187 Four techniques
served to control the infestations: establishment of parasitic insects such as
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wasps to destroy those damaging the trees; logging over-age timber stands;
spraying chemicals, such as DDT; and an unspecified method called "proper
forest management."188
Another serious outbreak of spruce budworm threatened commercial timber in
Lolo, Helena, and Deerlodge Forests in the summer of 1964. The Northern
Region planned to spray 155,000 acres in the Rock Creek and Monture Creek
drainages. Regional Forester Rahm specifically pointed out the economic
impact of the spruce budworm, valuing the infested timber as 30 million board
feet worth $300,000. The spray area contained 1.3 billion board feet of timber
not previously treated with chemical pesticides. In recognition of the
controversial perception of pesticides, and in marked contrast to the 1956 DDT
spraying, Rahm announced that the spray plan provided buffer zones one-quarter
to one-half mile wide on both sides of streams and lakes in the spray area.
Rahm also disclosed that representatives of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Montana Fish and Game
Department would be invited to observe the spraying.189
188"Forest
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On May 28, 1964 Rahm responded to widespread criticism of the Forest
Service's spruce budworm attack program. Rahm said, "Opposition to insect
and disease spray programs has gathered such momentum in Missoula and
within the State of Montana that it is timely for people to sit back and consider
the realities." The reality to which Rahm alluded was an annual 300-400
MMBF reduction in harvest due to insects and disease, and the curtailment of
the Christmas tree industry because of the spruce budworm. Rahm argued that
70 cents out of each dollar in Montana related in some way to the timber
industry, and suggestions that "we revert to a stone age culture" and leave the
forests to the elements were shortsighted.190
The 1964 spray program used the chemical malathion instead of DDT.191
Rahm maintained that malathion was safe, "We know that chickens can be
dusted with Malathion." Rahm offered as proof of the chemical's safety the
190"Forest
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1963 pilot spray program in the Bitterroot Forest where "not one fish was killed,
to our knowledge." Fish safety was a big issue since the 1964 spray area
included the blue-ribbon trout stream, Rock Creek.192
While citizens questioned the effects of chemicals on the health of their local
environment, other angry groups of residents questioned the impact of the Forest
Service's rapidly expanding timber harvests on the remaining roadless areas in
the Missoula vicinity. One of the first roadless area controversies featured a
protest over the development of a tract of pristine country north of the small
town of Lincoln, Montana, one-hour east of Missoula.
Until the completion of Montana Route 200 in 1957, Lincoln had existed in
relative isolation as a small mountain village closely involved in the outdoor
activities offered by the wild country north of town. With the coming of the
highway that linked Missoula and Great Falls via Rogers Pass over the
Continental Divide, the idyllic, rustic Lincoln began to change. What had taken
decades in other locations now arrived in Lincoln in a "telescoped" manner in
matter of a few years.193
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Arriving with Route 200 were trans-state and trans-continental truckers,
stopping at the new gas stations and convenience stores. Also tied to Lincoln's
joining with the outside world was the construction of a sawmill that employed
115 people. These developments contrasted with the traditional Lincoln
economy based on outfitting into the Bob Marshall Wilderness.194
Controversy came to Lincoln when the Forest Service, and in particular Helena
National Forest Supervisor Vern Hamre, decided to develop the Lincoln
backcountry for timber harvest and tourist road access. In a publication released
in March 1963 titled "Long Range Plan, Northern Half Lincoln Ranger District,
Helena National Forest," Hamre outlined his proposal. The plan called for a
network of roads through the area to facilitate timber harvest, provide access to
newly constructed picnic and camp sites, and to disperse hunting and fishing
pressure. The local community, and interested persons in Missoula, reacted
angrily when they learned of Hamre's plans.195
Hamre wanted to move quickly with his development plan, but opposition by
the local Lincoln Back Country Protective Association (led by former Forest
Service employee Cecil Garland), Clifton Merritt and the Montana Wilderness
Association and interest in the controversy on the part of Congressman Jim
Battin, forced public discussions. On April 19, 300 people, comprising much of
194Behan,
195Ibid,
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Lincoln's adult population and groups from out of town filled the small
community hall in Lincoln. Hamre took an hour and a half to outline his plan
to change forever the wilderness characteristics of the area.196
Mixed public reaction greeted Hamre's plan. The Forest service conducted the
meeting under a rule of 'equal time', so it appeared that Hamre enjoyed at least
half the meeting's support. Opponents, however, claimed that they had been
'gagged' by the Forest Service and questioned the usefulness of the meeting.
The Forest Service denied a proposal made during the meeting to call for a vote
on Hamre's plan. The result of the April 19 meeting was to solidify the
opposition to the Long Range Plan.197
In June, sensing the growing public opposition to the Long Range Plan, Hamre
modified his approach, slightly, eliminating part of one road. Regional Forester
Boyd Rasmussen visited the area the following October and offered Hamre
vigorous support. The modification did little to placate the opposition.198
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Interestingly, the timber industry, after initial support of the Long Range Plan,
grew increasingly silent on the issue as the controversy developed.199 Alone
the Forest Service faced a fight for a plan that enjoyed a shrinking basis of
public support. Within the win or lose climate that characterized the Lincoln
Back Country Controversy, the Forest Service 'dug-in' to battle the opposition
with no intention of compromise. Regional Forester Rasmussen, on October 15,
1963, announced that it was the Forest Service's intention to develop the
Lincoln Back Country within the next few years.200
In late 1963, Robert Morgan replaced Vern Hamre as Helena Supervisor.
Morgan saw the need for compromise and to Regional Office displeasure,
delayed development indefinitely. Morgan realized that a fight to the finish
over the Lincoln Long Range Plan would cost more to the Forest Service in
public relations than the available commodities were worth.201 Cecil Garland,
realizing that Morgan could be overwhelmed by Regional pressure to develop,
decided to call for wilderness designation for the area. In 1965, Senators Mike
Mansfield and Lee Metcalf introduced legislation to protect the 75,000 acres of
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the Back Country under the newly enacted Wilderness Act. Congressman
Battin, a Republican, did the Democrats one better and tacked on the Scapegoat
Mountain roadless area to the Lincoln Back Country to form a 240,500 acre
wilderness area. Mansfield and Metcalf soon abandoned their proposal to
support Battin's bill.202
The failure of Congress to include provisions in the Wilderness Act for the
Forest Service to evaluate non-administratively designated roadless areas, called
de facto wildernesses by advocates, led to a lengthy legislative history for the
Scapegoat Wilderness bill. Statutory recognition of the undesignated roadless
areas rested in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, specifically in Section 2
and the line about the compatibility of wilderness with the other uses of the
national forests.203 The Scapegoat wilderness proposal represented the first
citizen initiated wilderness legislation proposal after the passage of the
Wilderness Act of 1964. Many were aware of the proposal's precedent setting
potential and knew that it faced active, determined Forest Service
opposition.204 Finally in 1969, the U.S. Senate passed the Scapegoat bill, but
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in 1969 did Regional Forester Neal Rahm begin to realize the
inevitability of wilderness designation for the Lincoln-Scapegoat. Rahm tried to
push a plan that allowed for a 'Back Country' designation for some of the
Lincoln Back Country. Also included in his plan was a 75 mile "scenic"
highway along the Continental Divide. Wilderness proponents were not

93

the legislation languished in the House for another three years. Wayne Aspinall,
Chairman of the Interior Committee, delayed the bill by requiring a U.S.
Geological Survey report on the area's mineral potential.205
After the Geological report found no significant traces of mineralization in
1971, the fate of the Scapegoat bill rested with the ability of Senator Mansfield
to sway a recalcitrant Aspinall. In less than a year, Aspinall buckled, and in
1972 the Scapegoat Wilderness became the first de facto wilderness to join the
National Wilderness Preservation System.206
In this battle and elsewhere, wilderness preservationists increasingly
encountered an intransigent Forest Service that was dedicated to maximum
timber production. As they ran into an agency not interested in getting
management advice from outside the agency, preservationists had to turn to
other means to accomplish their goal of achieving wilderness protection.207 In
the Lincoln Controversy, the Montana congressional delegation came to the
rescue of the Scapegoat Wilderness. Another 1960s controversy- the Magruder

placated. Rahm acknowledged at that time the Forest Service had lost "control
and leadership in the sphere of Wilderness [sic] philosophy," Roth, 32.
205Roth,

33.

206Ibid.
207Allin,

154.

94

Corridor Controversy- also illustrates the power of grass roots organizations in
battling the utilitarian designs of the Forest Service.
In 1963 the Forest Service completed its reclassification proposal for the
immense Selway-Bitterroot Primitive Area. Included in the reclassification of
the area from primitive to wilderness (Regulation U-l), was the decision to
delete over one half million acres from the area's southern boundary and release
it to non-wilderness multiple use management. Local people called the southern
deletion the Magruder Corridor. Ostensibly, the reason for the deletion was the
presence of a fire road, built in 1934, through the area that linked the Bitterroot
Valley in the east to Idaho's Elk City in the west. The deleted territory lay
between the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness to the north and the Idaho Primitive
area, still not reclassified, to the south.208
The Magruder Corridor covered the upper drainage of the pristine waters of
the Selway River and contained extensive commercial timber stands, hence the
Forest Service's interest in excluding the area from wilderness protection.
Three-fourths of the area's timbered acreage contained commercial sawtimber.
Over half this acreage supported healthy stands of the valuable ponderosa and
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Douglas-fir species. The presence of the fire road made this timber especially
appealing.209
The Selway-Bitterroot reclassification decision in 1963 put the wilderness
advocates in a quandary. Howard Zahniser's reaction reflects this situation.
Zahniser celebrated the extension of U1 protection to the huge SelwayBitterroot, but he deplored the exclusion of the Magruder Corridor. Of
significance was another person disturbed by the deletion. Bitterroot Valley
resident Doris Milner had used the corridor as a favorite spot to take her family
on wilderness vacations for years.210
Outraged at the decision to exclude the Magruder Corridor and the subsequent
Forest Service refusal to reconsider the deletion, Milner decided to form a grass
roots organization and contest the deletion. On September 20, 1964 at a
meeting at Idaho's Lochsa Lodge, twelve members, including former Bitterroot
National Forest Supervisor G.M. Brandborg, founded the 'Save the Upper
Selway Committee'. The committee elected Doris Milner as chairman while
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she was away from the meeting, literally "out behind a bush." Milner proved to
be an indefatigable activist for the preservation of the Magruder Corridor.211
The passage of the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964, complicated matters
for the fledgling group. Wilderness decisions now emanated from the halls of
Congress, not at the desk of an agency bureaucrat. With the enactment of the
Wilderness Act, the Selway-Bitterroot became 'instant' wilderness, giving
statutory recognition to the Forest Service's reclassification, and this reinforced
the non-wilderness multiple use status of the Magruder Corridor.
The Forest Service's first priority in launching its development plans was
reconstructing the old 1934 fire road that traversed the corridor.

While the land

managers prepared for development, the citizen activists, joined by national
conservation organizations such as the Wilderness Society, made overtures to
the congressional delegations of Idaho and Montana. Critical to any effort to
preserve the Magruder Corridor was the support of Idaho's Senator Frank
Church, a legislator with known sympathies for the wild lands cause, and
Montana's Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf.212
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Milner presentation, Cunningham, 77-78. Mrs. Milner went to
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Senator Metcalf showed hesitancy in coming to the support of the preservation
of the Magruder Corridor. Metcalf opposed the deletion of the corridor during
the 1963 Selway-Bitterroot reclassification, but since the Wilderness Act had
been passed, he saw no need to reenter the fray. Besides, unlike the Lincoln
Back Country Controversy, not everyone in the local area disagreed with the
Forest Service's development plans. Timber interests in Montana's Bitterroot
Valley, especially the timber- dependent community of Darby, voiced their
support of the eventual logging of the corridor. Hamilton's newspaper The
Ravalli Republican, became a medium for the timber interests to oppose the
preservation designs of Milner and the Save the Upper Selway Committee.213
Crucial to the efforts of the Save the Upper Selway Committee was the
relationship of the Selway River drainage and the anadromous fishery that the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game struggled to restore. The rehabilitation of
this chinook salmon run had cost over a million dollars and represented five
years of difficult work. This effort could be rendered invalid by the expected
effects of increased silt load in the river caused by logging. Frank Church had a
great interest in the anadromous fisheries of Idaho. In April 1965, Church had
the pending Wild and Scenic Rivers Act revised to include the upper Selway.214
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With continued public interest in the area centering on the salmon runs, and
congressional support in the persons of Church and Metcalf, (who by now was
over his wilderness battle fatigue), the Save the Upper Selway Committee
managed to delay the Forest Service's logging plans. Gradually the controversy
attracted a wider audience that increasingly worried about the effects of
development on the pristine and fragile nature of the Magruder Corridor. In
1966, Church and Metcalf prevailed upon Secretary of Agriculture Orville
Freeman to appoint a non-Forest Service committee to study the effects of the
land use plans on the environment.215
On September 20, 1966 Secretary Freeman announced the formation of the
committee to study the Magruder Corridor. Dr. George A. Selke, special
consultant to Freeman and former Montana educator, chaired the committee.
Freeman gave the committee strict instructions not to consider the corridor for
inclusion into the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness. The committee was supposed
to concentrate on the advisability of implementing the development plans and
the effects of such development on the environment.216
A highlight of Selke's review was a series of three public meetings, held in
Grangeville and Boise, Idaho, and Missoula, Montana. For those who were
participating in the controversy, the public meetings were long awaited. Selke
215Cunningham,
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made a point of stressing that the meetings were not 'hearings' but, rather,
information gathering sessions. Both pro-and anti-development forces appeared
at these meetings. Pro-development advocates, usually connected to the timber
industry, voiced concerns about 'locking-up' natural resources and the effects of
resource lock-up on local communities' tax bases.217
On June 1, 1967 Secretary Freeman released the results of the Selke
Committee. The 58-page report criticized the Forest Service's development
plans as consistently lacking detail.

Contradicting the Forest Service, and

confirming preservationist suspicions, timber resources were found to be
marginal, at best. The Selke Committee judged the multiple use planning for
different sections in the corridor to be arbitrary and not based on a systematic
pattern of resource allocation. The Forest Service should manage the Magruder
Corridor for its watershed, fishery, historic, and recreational values, the
committee concluded.218
The Selke Committee's report contributed much to the credibility of the
preservationist groups struggling to save the Magruder Corridor. Forest Service
development plans abruptly stopped, as Secretary Freeman ordered the agency to
217,,Magruder
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devise a plan that fully coordinated multiple resource uses. Doris Milner was
elated by the report; the Forest Service had been "overruled in its own domain,"
the New York Times reported.219
As the Forest Service duly complied with the secretary's edict, they continued
to harbor development designs for the Magruder Corridor. Morton Brigham, an
Idaho wilderness activist claimed that the Forest Service planned to construct a
thirty-foot wide 'trail' to connect the corridor with the Salmon River Breaks
Primitive Area, to the south.220 In a 1968 progress report, Regional Forester
Neal Rahm mentioned that the directed study began after the close of the 1967
Fire Season. Rahm said the Forest Service studied the corridor's soil and
topography so that tentative locations for road and trail networks would have
minimal impact on the area's environmental values. Rahm added that timber
/

resources "have been intensively inventoried with an emphasis on the potential
growth of young stands."221
Rahm failed to appease preservationists such as Doris Milner. They called
for a wilderness bill to protect the corridor. The congressional delegations
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urged patience; they would not consider statutory protection until the Forest
Service completed its study.

Finally, in 1970 the Bitterroot National Forest

released its plan, again calling for extensive logging and road building for the
corridor. In an attempt to mollify preservationists, Bitterroot Forest Supervisor
Orville Daniels announced that the development would be delayed for five years
to allow for more study of stream sedimentation.222
Finally, after seven years of waiting for the Forest Service to demonstrate
some interest in preserving the natural values of the Magruder Corridor,
Senators Church and Metcalf, after reviewing the Bitterroot National Forest's
plan, gave up. In August 1971, the two introduced legislation in the Senate
calling for wilderness protection for the Magruder Corridor.

Another nine

years would pass before, in the summer of 1980, legislation definitively
established the Magruder Corridor as a part of the Selway-Bitterroot
Wilderness.223
As one of the longest fights in conservation history, the Magruder Controversy
attracted national attention to the wilderness preservation battle. Montana and
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Idaho wilderness activists became known throughout the wider conservation
community as leaders in the preservation struggle. The Magruder episode
illustrated the difficulty in allocating resources among a public dedicated to
different uses.224 Magruder also demonstrated the power of grass roots
organizations, especially when they enlisted the aid of sympathetic congressional
influences. Magruder stands with the Lincoln Controversy as an example of
local people using Congress to circumscribe Forest Service development plans.
During the same period, in Colorado, wilderness advocates resorted to another
powerful branch of government to arrest Forest Service development of
wilderness in the famous East Meadow Creek case.
East Meadow Creek flowed in a timbered area directly west of the Gore
Range-Eagle's Nest Primitive Area in Colorado's White River National Forest.
The newly constructed (1964) resort community of Vail lay nine miles south of
the area. In 1962 the Forest Service proposed to log the area, and in 1964
constructed a road to the edge of the East Meadow Creek area to support the
future timber sale. More than five million board feet of timber were involved in
any potential sale in the area and this required Regional Office approval of the
sale. Rocky Mountain Region Forester David Nordwall recognized a potential
conflict in developing East Meadow Creek: The Region had not completed its
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primitive area reviews for possible inclusion into the National Wilderness
Preservation System, as directed by the 1964 Wilderness Act. Nordwall
proposed a comprise that allowed for the logging of the majority of the area but
reserved a small buffer zone next to the primitive area.225
In 1969 a timber sale contract went out for bids for the East Meadow Creek
timber. Kaibab Industries, Inc. of Phoenix, Arizona won the contract. This sale
triggered a group of Vail residents led by Robert W. Parker and the Sierra Club
to move to prevent the contract from being fulfilled.226 The residents of Vail
feared the development would degrade the quality of the country that
surrounded their resort community and that the logging would cut into tourist
dollars. Clifton Merritt, regional director of the Wilderness Society, pointed the
Vail people to a young criminal lawyer, Tony Ruckel, for advice on contesting
the sale in court.227
With funding provided by the Sierra Club, Ruckel took the case. He
originally wanted to pursue the case through the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act, but Merritt pointed him toward the Wilderness Act for legal ammunition.
The Wilderness Act states in Section 3, (b),:
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Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in proposing, as
part of his recommendations to Congress, the alteration of existing
boundaries of primitive areas or recommending the addition of any
contiguous area of national forest lands predominantly of
wilderness value.22S[emphasis added]
Here was the angle Ruckel and company could use to upset the development
plans of the Forest Service. East Meadow Creek was contiguous to the
designated wilderness of Gore Range-Eagle's Nest.229
Suing the federal government was a relatively new tactic in early 1970.
Preparing the way for environmental litigants to follow was the landmark Scenic
Hudson I case230, a case that set the precedent for court's to review the
authority of federal agencies to make management decisions. Scenic Hudson I
had a wide application because it held that an agency could be accountable to
justify its decisions when competing public interests are at stake.231 The East
Meadow Creek development thus was reviewable in the courts.
Ruckel and a legal team that included the future Governor of Colorado,
Richard D Lamm, argued their case before District Judge William E. Doyle, Jr.
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in Denver in January 1970. In Parker v. United States, Ruckel claimed that
East Meadow Creek was contiguous to designated wilderness and that the
country exhibited wilderness characteristics. He further claimed that the Forest
Service had not considered that area for possible addition to the designated
wilderness area. Ruckel completed his argument by stating that, according to
the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service could not change the area's wilderness
character until they completed a study and the President and the Congress had
an opportunity to consider the area for inclusion into the existing wilderness
area.232
Judge Doyle found that the Parker team had legal standing to contest the case
and that the district court had jurisdiction. He therefore rejected the
government's request for summary judgement to dismiss the case. Doyle further
allowed into evidence testimony by 'expert witness' Clifton Merritt attesting to
the genuine wilderness values present in East Meadow Creek.233
The Forest Service's attorneys did not contest the essential wilderness quality
of East Meadow Creek. Rather, they relied on a tactic that they would continue
to rely upon in future wilderness squabbles, a doctrine of strict adherence to the
definition of wilderness as provided for in the Wilderness Act. The proximity
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of the nearby road to East Meadow Creek prohibited the area from wilderness
consideration, the defendants argued. Furthermore, mining claims existed in the
area and the Denver Water Board looked to the area as a possible water
diversion site. East Meadow Creek violated the Forest Service's 'purity
principle'234 and thus was best utilized for timber management.235
Judge Doyle ruled for Ruckel, agreeing that the Forest Service had to allow
the President and Congress the opportunity to consider contiguous wilderness
for inclusion into the National Wilderness Preservation System. A timber sale
would irrevocably remove this opportunity, and so he issued an injunction to
enjoin the contract with Kaibab Industries. Unconvinced by Doyle, the Forest
Service and timber companies appealed the decision. On October 1, 1971 the
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Doyle's ruling and the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear any further appeal.236
Parker represented a major defeat for the Forest Service, and not just in
Colorado. The agency would have to consider the decision every time they
attempted to develop a site contiguous to wilderness. The courts had restricted
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the management options of the Forest Service concerning contiguous wilderness.
Later, the National Environmental Policy Act would encroach further into the
Forest Service's realm of timber management and cause untold trouble for the
agency.

?

In late 1970, as if the Forest Service did not have enough to worry about,
another stinging critique of the management policies of the Forest Service
emerged from the mountain West. Senator Lee Metcalf released a report made
by a select committee of the University of Montana on the management
practices of the Bitterroot National Forest. By the time the Bitterroot
Controversy had run its course, Forestry and the Forest Service would never be
the same.
As the process of timber harvesting gained momentum in the 1960s, the results
of intensive timber management began to become visible to the public; clearcuts
on the sides of hills were not hard to recognize. In the scenic Bitterroot Valley
of western Montana, surrounded by the Bitterroot National Forest, some local
residents took offense to what the Forest Service was doing to their valley's
scenery.237
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Bitterroot National Forest cut 583.3 MMBF during the years 19611970, while the annual allowable cut during the same period was 504 MMBF;
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figures illustrate that the Bitterroot National Forest, as a part of the more arid
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In 1962, Bitterroot Valley citizens established a Resources Conservation and
Development (RC&D) Project that focused on the emerging denuded slopes of
the Bitterroot Mountains. Three former Forest Service employees, Charles
MacDonald (a former district ranger), Champ Hannon, and former long-time
Bitterroot National Forest Supervisor G.M. Brandborg allied themselves with the
discontented locals. They believed the Forest Service's methods of managing
timber were wrong and especially in the case of Brandborg, their dissent from
the Forest Service caused personal hardships. Active Forest Service employees
received orders not to associate with the dissenters.238
Local concerns that the Forest Service was harvesting timber at an
unsustainable rate coalesced in a subcommittee of the RC&D called the
Recreation Committee. By 1968, this committee took the offensive against
Bitterroot National Forest officials who refused to respond to their complaints.
They contacted the Regional Office in Missoula, invited journalist Dale Burk of
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The Missoulian to come and have a look, and they appealed to Senators
Mansfield and Metcalf.239 Early in 1969 this barrage of pressure prompted
Regional Forester Neal Rahm to appoint an in-house task force to review the
iiaanagement practices in the Bitterroot.24®
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As the Forest Service Task Force conducted their review, Dale Burk broke the
story of public discontent with the Bitterroot National Forest in a series of
articles that began in The Missoulian on November 2, 1969. These articles
featured Bitterroot citizens who thought the Bitterroot National Forest's
managers were destroying the countryside, and interviews with both the
dissenters and officials of the Forest Service, notably Bitterroot Supervisor
Merrill Tester. Burk's expose sparked a fierce public debate over what was
gaining notoriety as the Bitterroot Controversy.241
As Dale Burk informed western Montana of the controversy, Senator Lee
Metcalf wrote a letter to Arnold Bolle, Dean of the School of Forestry at the
University of Montana. Metcalf told Bolle he had received a number of letters
from his constituents (Metcalf had grown up in Stevensville, a small town in the
Bitterroot Valley) critical of Forest Service timber policy. He asked Bolle to
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form a committee to study the Forest Service's management in the Bitterroot
National Forest. Metcalf closed his letter to Bolle with a bit of flattery, "I look
forward, as always, to receiving advice from the best School of Forestry in the
nation."242
Bolle selected six fellow faculty members at the University of Montana to
assist in preparing a report for Senator Metcalf.243 Bolle and his fellow
faculty members received the official title of 'Select Committee of the
University of Montana'. At first, the committee did not recognize the
significance of their work. Committee member Thomas Payne remembers the
mission of the study was originally felt to be little more than "quieting some
local concerns."244 Soon Payne and his colleagues would be at the center of a
firestorm.
While the Select Committee pursued their study, the Forest Service's Task
Force released their findings. Known as the 'Worf Report' after the Task

242Lee

Metcalf to Arnold Bolle, December 2, 1969, reprinted in Senate
Document No. 91-115, "A University View of the Forest Service," December 1,
1970, v.
243The

faculty members were: Richard Behan, Associate Professor of natural
resource policy and administration at the School of Forestry; W. Leslie
Pengelly, Professor of wildlife management at the School of Forestry; Robert
Wambach, Professor of forest economics; Gordon Browder, Professor of
Sociology; Thomas Payne, Professor of political science; and Richard Shannon,
Professor of economics.
^Interview with Thomas Payne, October 30, 1992, notes.
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Force's Chairman William R. Worf, Chief of the Regional Division of
Recreation and Lands, the Task Force offered a thorough critique of the
management practices of the Bitterroot National Forest. The first observation
listed in the report stated that an attitude existed among much of the staff of the
Bitterroot Forest that "resource production" goals come before other land
management considerations. The Task Force admitted that this emphasis on
resource production goals was not unique to the Bitterroot Forest but derived
from "subtle pressures and attitudes coming from above."245
The Task Force severely criticized the Bitterroot's lack of adequate
communications with the public. This situation, in part, resulted from the lack
of advancement in multiple use planning to provide firm management direction
necessary for quality land management. This direction would facilitate
informing the public of the Forest Service's long range plans. Additionally,
quality control on Forest Service projects needed improvement. Timber projects
had left scars and waste that angered citizens and Task Force found these lapses
in quality control unnecessary. Finally, the Task Force warned that the needed
improvements in the Bitterroot National Forest could not come as a result of
simply increasing funding and that the public should hot expect changes
overnight.246
^"Management Practices," 9.
^Ibid, 9-15.
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The Worf Report represented the agency's attempt to keep the Bitterroot
Controversy localized; the Forest Service viewed the controversy as a Forest
Service problem and not the manifestation of any 1960s-style social movement
that fostered a distrust of anything related to the government. The Task Force
labored hard and provided a disturbing picture of the Bitterroot, and they were
careful to avoid any appearance of favoritism or bias. They addressed, while
not always finding fault with sensitive subjects such as the overuse of
terracing247, and clearcutting.248
Outside of the Missoula-Bitterroot area, the Worf Report drew little attention.
But when the Select Committee released its report "A University View of the
Forest Service," suddenly national attention was focused on the Bitterroot
Controversy. To the surprise of the faculty members of the committee, Senator
Lee Metcalf released the report to the press and ordered 20,000 copies printed

^Terracing was a site preparation method to ensure maximum forest
regeneration after a substantial harvest technique, such as clearcutting or seed
tree cutting, had been employed. Bulldozers carved terraces into the steep
hillsides to facilitate machine replanting and seedling survival. Terraces left the
landscape with a 'stadium-like' appearance and was especially resented by the
residents of the Bitterroot Valley. The practice began in 1964 and ended with
the Bitterroot Controversy. Even today (1993), evidence of terracing is still
visible from the valley floor on sites with poor forest regeneration.
^Luke Popovich, "The Bitterroot- Remembrances of Things Past, Part
One," The Journal of Forestry, (December 1975), 791-792.

113

as a Senate Document.249 Suddenly, the Forest Service was on the defensive;
they had to defend their policies on a level and scope far beyond any of the
other controversies they faced in the 1960s.
The 'Bolle Report', as the Select Committee's work was known, charged the
Forest Service with poor management in the Bitterroot National Forest, but
stopped short of a full condemnation of the Forest Service.250 Among the
more severe of the committee's findings were:
Multiple use management, in fact, does not exist as the governing
principle on the Bitterroot National Forest; Quality timber
management and harvest practices are missing. Consideration of
recreation, watershed, wildlife and grazing appear as afterthoughts;
The practice of terracing on the BNF should be stopped. Existing

249Arnold

Bolle thought Metcalf would use the report privately. Thomas
Payne believes Metcalf may have been searching for ammunition to support his
private environmental crusade, and Bolle remembers Metcalf as very concerned
with the developing controversy in the Bitterroot. Metcalf, influenced by the
power of the Anaconda Company on Montana life, viewed himself as the
people's champion. "I guess you could say he was a populist," says Arnold
Bolle, Arnold Bolle, Oral History 249, conducted by Gerald Williams May 1,
1990, K. Ross Toole Archives, Mansfield Library, University of Montana,
Missoula, MT, Interview with Thomas Payne.
250The

popular portrayal of the Bolle Report as a ringing polemical
condemnation of the Forest Service and of the Worf Report, is somewhat
inaccurate. Many similarities exist between the two reports, the key difference
seems to be one of the degree of critique. Bolle did not think that the report
condemned the Forest Service at all, in fact the Select Committee revised earlier
drafts of the report to tone down harsh language, Luke Popovich, "The
Bitterroot- A Fading Polemic," Journal of Forestry, (January 1976), 39; Arnold
Bolle Oral History.
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terraced areas should be dedicated for research; A clear distinction
must be made between timber management and timber mining251
Finding a deviation from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act's definition of
multiple use, the Bolle Report accorded with the Worf Report. However, the
charge of timber mining stung the agency. The Select Committee charged the
Forest Service with cutting marginal timber on sites that were not conducive to
economical regeneration. This charge engendered the sharpest opposition from
the Forest Service.252
Officially, the Forest Service welcomed the Bolle Report as "one more
important input toward meeting our goal of achieving high quality, balanced
management of the national forests." Regional Forester Rahm released a
statement that praised the Select Committee for their "frankness, courage, and
dedication." Rahm then went on to point out that his, the Worf Report,
investigation had already addressed the problems mentioned in the Bolle Report,
and that the Select Committee's findings supported most of the Worf
Report.253

251"A

University View of the Forest Service," 13.

252"A

University View of the Forest Service," 24; Popovich, "The BitterrootRemembrances of Things Past," 792.
253"Forest

Service Welcomes University Review of Bitterroot National Forest
Activities: Commends Committee for Frankness, Dedication," United States
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Region Press Release #R-1
860, November 25, 1970, Government Documents Division, Mansfield Library,
University of Montana, Missoula, MT.
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Despite the Select Committee's professed intent to the contrary, the Bolle
Report devastated the Forest Service. The report called into question the
agency's competence to manage the nation's forests- forests that the agency
viewed as their own. Multiple use policy was now in a shambles; timber
production mania had crippled the policy's credibility. The profession of
forestry was bitterly divided over the Bolle Report, as timber industry foresters
took offense to the implication that they were behind the Forest Service's
devastation of the Bitterroot scenery. Debate raged in professional journals as
foresters took sides.254 Most importantly, the Forest Service lost its position
as leader of the profession and its multiple use creed was reduced to the level of
a slogan.255
Dale Burk considers the Bitterroot Controversy to be the turning point in
Forest history. Many changes resulted from the controversy, most notably the
congressional guidelines on clearcutting promulgated by Senator Frank Church.
The 'Church Guidelines' laid the foundation for the 1976 National Forest
Management Act and was the first comprehensive legislation to govern forestry
practices on the national forests. As the 1970s dawned, the Forest Service
254For

examples of the acrimony surrounding the controversy, see the
various articles in American Forests during the time of the Bolle Report,
November 1970 until well into 1971. Significantly, interviews with professional
foresters from that era reveal substantial hostility about the controversy, hostility
that still exists today.
255Clary,

187.
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confronted a new public consciousness on things environmental. The agency
would have a difficult time adjusting to the infusion of public opinion into the
policies of the national forests.256

256Interview

with Dale A. Burk, March 18, 1993, Stevensville, MT, notes.

CHAPTER FOUR: Courts, Congress, and Roadless Area Controversies

Wilderness controversy was not solved by the congressional action to protect
wildlands with statute law. Conflict quickly developed over the expansion of
the Forest Service's portion of the National Wilderness Preservation system.
The Forest Service, and later the Carter Administration tried to solve the
'problem' of how much acreage to include in the system with large nationwide
programs that failed in their objectives and engendered increased hostility
between the competing land use interest groups.
With President Johnson's signing of the Wilderness Act on September 3, 1964,
9.1 million acres became 'instant wilderness'. Congress, through the Wilderness
Act, also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to study, within ten years, all the
remaining L-20 primitive areas and report to the President their suitability or
non-suitability for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.
While the act included as well a directive to the Secretary of the Interior to
study and report on every roadless area containing 5,000 or more acres located
in the national parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges, Congress neglected the
status of de facto wilderness in national forests.257 This important omission

257The

Wilderness Act of 1964, Public Law 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, Section 3,

b, c.
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had severe consequences for both the Forest Service and the 'user' groups, as
debate focused on the disposition of the roadless area resource in the national
forests.
The Forest Service began its task of implementing the Wilderness Act by
appointing a task force to draw up policy guidelines.258 Two immediate
problems confronted the task force: the management of the wilderness areas
according to the provisions of the act, and the completion of the primitive area
reviews prior to the congressional deadline of September 3, 1974. After nine
months of study, the task force presented a first draft of the wilderness
regulations on November 20, 1964.259
The public reviewed the draft regulations for a year and a half, afterwhich the
Forest Service released final regulations covering its portion of the National
Wilderness Preservation System on May 31, 1966. The public commentary on
the regulations generated "heated discussion," with the majority of respondents
sympathetic to the wilderness concept. Also of significance, in the process of
drafting the regulations the task force discovered that future management
258This

task force included: Arnold Synder, District Ranger, Sierra National
Forest, California; George Williams, Wilderness staff Region 6; Ed Slusher,
Wilderness staff, Region 1; and Bill Worf, Supervisor of the Bridger National
Forest in Wyoming.
259William

A. Worf, C. Glen Gorgensen, and Robert C. Lucas, "Committee
Report on Wilderness," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,
May 17, 1972, Wilderness file, Archives, Headquarters Northern Region,
Missoula, MT, 2.
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procedures would have to account for possible, even likely, expansion of the
wilderness system.260
As early as the mid-sixties, during the drafting of the widerness regulations,
the Forest Service determined to adopt a policy of strict adherence to the letter
of the Wilderness Act for determining an area's suitability for wilderness. As
with the multiple use policy, the task force noted the pressure to satisfy all the
"special interests" demanding that their use be accommodated in the wilderness.
Some of the uses violated the Wilderness Act in that they proposed uses at
variance with wilderness preservation, Howard Zahniser had called these
activities non-conforming. This pressure influenced a reliance on a strict
interpretation of the Wilderness Act for determining suitability. Strict
adherence, or the purity principle, also worked effectively to exclude from
wilderness consideration many roadless areas that had commercial timber.261
The 1964 Task Force recognized that many roadless tracts of Forest Service
land possessed 'outstanding potential' for wilderness and should receive
consideration for inclusion into the wilderness system. In the first draft of the
regulations, the task force called for the identification of these roadless areas by
260Ibid,

3-5. No doubt this realization owes something to the LincolnScapegoat and Magruder Corridor controversies that were raging full-scale at
that time.
261Ibid,

5. The East Meadow Creek Controversy represents an early
example of the Forest Service's use of the purity principle to attempt to exclude
potential timber from wilderness.
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December 31, 1966. The Chief and the Regional Foresters accepted this
recommendation in principle but thought that the deadline was too short.262 It
was not until January 1967, that the Washington Office issued a directive to the
Regional Foresters "to identify all areas which seem to satisfy the criteria
meriting recommendation for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation
System."263
The directive set June 30, 1970 as the deadline for completion of the roadless
area inventory.264 However, most Regional Foresters and their subordinates
ignored the directive. To the rangers 'in the field' the directive to inventory
roadless areas was an additional burden added to the task of evaluating primitive
areas by the congressionally established deadline. Some district rangers were
upset by the directive one ranger in the Willamette National Forest in Oregon
reportedly replied, "I'll delineate the boundaries of those roadless areas, by
clearcutting right up to their edge."265

262Ibid,

7.

263"Roadless

Area Review and Evaluation, Final Environmental Impact
Statement," United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, October
15, 1973, 13.
264"Committee
265Interview

Report on Wilderness," 7.

with Tom Donahue, Recreation Specialist, Northern Region,
March 17, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.
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Roadless area inventories were overlooked in the effort to review the primitive
areas. In the Missoula area, one primitive area review in the Mission Mountains
produced a controversy. The Forest Service announced its list of alternatives for
the future of the Mission Mountain Primitive Area in 1969.266 These
alternatives ranged from preserving the entire area as wilderness to releasing the
entire area to non-wilderness multiple use management. The Forest Service
solicited public opinion in their deliberations on the area. In June 1970, it
released its recommendation to the President that the Mission Mountains be
included in the Wilderness System- with some boundary shrinkage of the former
primitive area.267
The Mission Mountains proposal was illustrative of the purity principle as a
determinant factor in a wilderness recommendation. Controversy arose out of
the recommended exclusions of areas that exhibited human impact in the
Missions. In the 1950s' spruce bark beetle infestations in some areas of the
primitive area had been clearcut, and these areas were now excluded from the
wilderness recommendation. Despite the Forest Service's admission that the
logged sites had substantial tree regeneration and that the roads had been closed
since the completion of the timber harvests, they excluded the areas because
266United

States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Flathead
National Forest, "A Proposal: Mission Mountains Wilderness," May 1971.
267John

M. McCabe, "A Wilderness Primer," Montana Law Review, (Vol.32,
1971), 32-33.
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"man's imprint" was noticeable, thus disqualifying the areas from wilderness
protection.268
Preservationists, enlisting the aid of Senator Lee Metcalf, contested the Forest
Service deletions from the Mission Wilderness proposal. They argued that the
human impacts in the Mission Mountains were temporary; wilderness would
heal and return to its natural condition. Public organizations became involved in
an effort to reverse the Forest Service's deletions. A unique example of public
participation in wilderness politics was a 'Project 100' (a children's
rehabilitation program) class that handed out information pamphlets to people at
street corners and supermarkets in Missoula.269
The Forest Service recommended a portion of the primitive area that lacked
commercial timber for wilderness and this was characteristic of the agency's
recommendations. In fact, much of the proposal concentrated on the economic
evaluation of the area's raw material capacity and not its suitability for
wilderness. A wilderness area recommendation prerequisite seemed to be a lack
of raw material potential. The Forest Service would rely on this qualifier in
future wilderness recommendations.270

268Ibid,

34.

269Interview

McCabe, 34.
270Ibid,

33.

with Dale Burk, March 18, 1993, Stevensville, MT, notes;
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The Mission Mountains Primitive Area received formal wilderness protection
with the passage of an omnibus wilderness act in 1975.271 The Forest
Service-backed legislation sought to designate 73,207 acres in the Mission
Mountains as wilderness, while in the House a bill called for 75,588 acres. The
approximate 2,000 acre difference corresponded to the Forest Service deletions
of the previously harvested timber areas. Reasoning that to exclude the areas
that exhibited the non-conforming use would cause a major disruption to
management, the House negotiators, in the Conference Committee proposed
including the disputed 2,000 acres.272
Led by Lee Metcalf, the Senate concurred in the House addition of the
disputed acres and included Metcalf's amendment to tack on another 370 acre
parcel. The Forest Service specifically opposed wilderness status for this parcel
because of close-by roads and timber harvest sites. For the Forest Service, this
parcel of land lacked sufficient purity with respect to the definition of
wilderness provided for in the Wilderness Act. Metcalf's amendment effectively
represented congressional rejection of the purity principle, and tacitly recognized

271"An

Act Designating Certain National Forest Wilderness Areas in
California, Colorado, and Montana," Public Law 93-632, 88 Stat. 2155. This
multi-state omnibus bill designated six wilderness areas comprising a total of
998,088 acres.
272"An

Act Designating Certain National Forest Wilderness Areas in
California, Colorado, and Montana," Senate Report 93-1043, SS 13057-6, 41-44.
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the recuperative powers of nature.273 The Mission Mountains Wilderness
stood as an example that Congress would decide what constituted wilderness
and not the Forest Service- a process that actually began three years earlier with
the passage of the Scapegoat Wilderness bill.
Congress, somewhat unwittingly, had a major impact not only on Forest
Service wilderness policy but on forest management in general with its passage
in 1969 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).274 With the
arguable exception of the 1973 Endangered Species Act, no other piece of
legislation has had an equal impact on citizen's legal challenges to forest policy
than NEPA.275 Central to the power of the act to affect Forest Service policy
was Section 102 that mandated the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement when the agency undertook any action that would have a major
impact on the environment.276

273Ibid,

42.

274National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1970). NEPA's legislative history reveals little discussion of the potential
of the act to affect federal agency policy as it affects the environment.
275William

C. Siegel, "Environmental Law: Some Implications for Forest
Resource Management," Environmental Law, (Fall, 1973), 122.
276Throughout

the rest of this chapter I will have numerous occasions to
refer to environmental impact statements; the following abbreviations will be
used: EIS, environmental impact statement, in general; DES, draft environmental
impact statement; and FES, final environmental impact statement.
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NEPA was far from a precise statute and much confusion developed over the
law's true meaning. Federal agencies such as the Forest Service initially chose
to regard NEPA as a broad, general statement of policy goals, not as a directive.
The judiciary, as a result of lawsuits brought under the act, emerged as the
enforcement element in NEPA's role as a environmental reform law. Congress
seemed to desire the judicial branch of government to become the enforcement
element: Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized this intent when
he wrote, "In fact, this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no
more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA."277
The first lawsuit to involve NEPA directly, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission (1971)278,

:

provided a clear view of the courts' intentions concerning the act. District of
Columbia Circuit Judge Skelly Wright ruled that the courts have the power to
require federal agencies to comply with the requirements of NEPA.
Enforcement of Congressional legislative intent fell to the judicial branch: as
Judge Wright wrote in the court's Calvert Cliffs opinion, "Our duty, . . .is to see
that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."279
277Dissent

in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 421, (1976).

278449

F.2d 1109 (1971).

279449

F.2d at 1111.
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Calvert Cliffs established the doctrine of "strict compliance" in regard to
NEPA. The Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, an environmental group,
challenged the Atomic Energy Commission's regulations governing the
consideration of environmental issues. Calvert Cliffs maintained that the
Commission's preclusion of review in a case involving nonradiological
environmental matters, unless specifically raised during the agency's internal
review process, was a violation of NEPA.280 Calvert Cliffs claimed the
Commission's rules failed to satisfy the rigor demanded by NEPA. On the
other hand, the Commission maintained that NEPA was vague and left room for
broad interpretation and that the challenged rules were well within the
provisions of the act.281
Congressional intent formed the basis for the D.C. Circuit's opinion that
established the standard of strict compliance. Judge Wright rejected NEPA as a
general policy guideline and construed it as a more forceful procedural directive.
Through NEPA, Congress "reordered priorities" so that agencies would consider
the environment as an equal with other considerations such as economics and
technical matters. Thus, NEPA was not "highly flexible" but instead set a strict
standard for compliance.282

280Ibid.

at 1109.

281Ibid.

at 1112.

282Ibid.
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Section 102, of Title I of the act, provided the impetus for the D.C. Circuit's
opinion. Granting that the first section of the act, 101, could supply only a
flexible guideline, the court found that Section 102 set definite procedures.283
Environmental protection became part of every federal agency's mandate. The
multiple considerations of economics, technicalities, and the environment
involved a "balancing process" in which no one consideration automatically
outweighed another.284 Agencies had to consider the environment precisely by
law, and failure to do so would involve the courts.
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
District Court's ruling in favor of the Atomic Energy Commission and
established the first real interpretation of NEPA. After Calvert Cliffs, the courts
held agencies, including the Forest Service, accountable for compliance with

283In

summary, Section 102 mandates that agencies: (a)utilize a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences ... (b) identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and
technical considerations; (c) prepare a written impact statement for every action
significantly affecting the human environment; (d) study, develop, and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action; (e) where consistent
with the foreign policy of the United States, coordinate with international
interests in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's
world environment; (f) make available to States, counties, municipalities,
institutions, and individuals, advice and information ...; (g) initiate and utilize
ecological information ... National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public
Law 91-190.
284449

F.2d at 1113.
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NEPA in the strictest sense. In further litigation, and there would be much of it,
the standard first articulated by the D.C. Circuit would provide guidance to
other courts as they assumed their duties as the interpreters of NEPA.
NEPA and the courts first clashed with the Forest Service, in a substantive
way over the agency's first Roadless Area Review and Evaluation. In 1967, the
Washington Office, in part responding to preservationist clamor, directed
Regional Foresters to inventory the roadless areas in their regions that met the
requirements of the Wilderness Act. As we have seen, because of conflicts with
primitive area reviews and general lack of interest the agency realized, by 1969,
that the regions could not meet the deadline date of June 30, 1970.285
Accordingly, the Chief amended the regulations in May 1969 to extend the
deadline to June 30, 1972.286
By 1971 Chief Edward P. Cliff recognized that the new June 1972 deadline
was in jeopardy. He issued directives to the regions to complete the inventory
by the specified date and to report their recommendations for areas that merited

285"Committee
286Glen

Report on Wilderness," 7.

O. Robinson, The Forest Service; A Study in Public Land
Management. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 163,
"Committee Report on Wilderness," 7; Roadless Area Review and Evaluation
FES 1973, appendix 11.
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further study as New Study Areas.287 These new directives, in part a response
to growing outside pressures to expand the wilderness system, were a
continuation of the 1967 directives, but received the title: Roadless Area Review
and Evaluation (RARE).288
The objective of the RARE program did not involve actual recommendations
for wilderness additions; rather it proposed the selection of those areas that were
best suited for further study of possible future wilderness suitability. RARE
attempted to employ a systematic analysis from which to derive wilderness
study recommendations. This analysis included: an inventory of the roadless
areas in the national forests; public involvement; Regional Forester
recommendations; an interdisciplinary evaluation of the Regional Foresters'
recommendations; and finally, the Chief's final selections. The first phase of

287Robinson,

163. Craig W. Allin notes congressional and administration
pressure to inventory the roadless areas. Preservationists maintained that the
Forest Service, as demonstrated by the Mission Mountains Controversy, was
misapplying the 1964 Wilderness Act by relying on the purity principle to
determine wilderness suitability. In 1971, the Council on Environmental
Quality, created by Title II of NEPA, circulated a draft executive order to
inventory the roadless areas and protect them as wilderness until the President
and Congress considered them for official inclusion in the system, Allin, 159160.
288Interview

with Tom Donahue; "Roadless Area Review and Evaluation,
Final Environmental Impact Statement."
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RARE produced a DES, followed by a second evaluative phase that produced
the program's final recommendations.289
To qualify as a RARE roadless area (not necessarily conferring New Study
Area status), an area had to exhibit two characteristics: be roadless and
undeveloped; and contain at least 5,000 acres.290 An area that was roadless
and undeveloped had to pass three tests: need, suitability, and availability291
These three tests, promulgated in the wilderness regulations drawn up by the
1964 task force, applied the Forest Service's purity principle to the evaluation of
wild country.
The 1964 task force's explanation of the reasons for relying on the purity
principle notwithstanding, what an examination of the three tests for roadless
area qualification reveals a determination to protect commodities from 'lock-up'
and economic non-utilization. Gifford Pinchot's original idea for the national
forests to supply timber to local communities and industries still guided Forest
Service managers. Forests contributed to the local communities' economies first
and foremost; wilderness preservation occupied a lower priority. This reality
was evident in the availability test, as specified in . . .

289"Roadless

Area Review and Evaluation, Final Environmental Impact
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Following are examples of lands which must, in the public interest,
be fully developed and intensively managed for sustained yield
production of resources other than Wilderness. The following
would usually be considered as unavailable for Wilderness:
1. Areas where the need for increased water production and
additional onsite storage is so vital that the installation or
maintenance of works and facilities incompatible with Wilderness
is an obvious and inevitable public necessity.
2. Areas where the Wilderness classification would seriously
restrict or prevent the application of wildlife management measures
of considerable urgency and importance.
3- Highly mineralized areas . . .
4- National Forest areas supporting heavy stands of high-quality
timber, all of which is essential to the economic welfare of existing
dependent communities, [emphasis added]
5 Areas containing natural phenomena of such unique or
outstanding nature that general public access should be provided.
6. Lands needed to meet important long-range needs for
developed recreation areas, such as winter sports sites,
campgrounds, and picnic areas.292
This availability test effectively omitted those lands with marketable stands of
timber from the inventory, thus preserving the timber base.
The RARE FES discussed, at length, the public commentary involved in the
project. Nationally, the Forest Service held over 300 public meetings attended
by 25,000 people. The agency received approximately 54,000 written
individual and group opinions on RARE, and petitions containing 18,000
signatures came to the Forest Service. The goals of soliciting public opinion
were to ascertain whether the public desired more wilderness, and to receive the
public's suggestions for additions or deletions to the inventory. The Forest

292Ibid,

609.

132

Service reported strong support for more additions to the National Wilderness
Preservation System, but they also reported that public opinion indicated that not
all the roadless areas should be preserved.293
Inventory and initial evaluation of the roadless areas occurred during the
winter and spring of 1971-1972. RARE turned out to be more haphazard than
systematic or comprehensive. In the Northern Region a ranger remembered
RARE as nothing more than a quick response to a memorandum from the
Washington Office. "We assembled a series of maps, drew lines around the
roadless areas and sent them off," a Kootenai National Forest planner said; no
in-depth physical inventory happened 294
The San Francisco-based Sierra Club, disturbed at what they interpreted as a
ploy to speed the development of America's remaining unprotected wild
forested lands, observed that RARE might be vulnerable to NEPA in court.
Consequently, they filed suit against the Department of Agriculture and the
Forest Service to enjoin any development of national forest roadless areas. The
Sierra Club obtained a preliminary injunction against Forest Service
development of listed RARE roadless areas on August 16, 1972.295
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In Sierra Club v. Butz, District Judge Samuel J. Conti, following the Calvert
Cliffs interpretation, found that the Forest Service failed to comply with NEPA
in their RARE program. The Sierra Club pointed out that the areas not
recommended for study status by the RARE process were likely to be developed
under multiple use management. They argued that this was a major federal
action that required compliance with NEPA. Conti was cognizant that his
decision would be considered by the Forest Service as judicial interference in
forest management, but Conti asserted the court's authority to ensure that the
Forest Service complied with the law. Conti reduced the case to a question of
NEPA compliance and judged that the Forest Service's RARE program fell
under the purview of NEPA.296
Attorneys from the Department of Justice, representing the Forest Service,
argued that NEPA did not apply to RARE; the Forest Service's policy stemmed
from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. They further protested that RARE
did not represent a federal action as contemplated by NEPA. Without a formal
decision to commit an action that would impact the environment, the defendants
maintained, there could be no NEPA applicability. Conti disagreed:
But as we all know that sometimes a non-decision or a non-action
can be a breach of an affirmative duty to act. And I believe in
this case, where you have a situation where the Forest Service in
not acting upon this land in an affirmative nature and unclassifying

2963

ELR at 20072.
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it, and by having it in a category of unclassified, that it then
becomes under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, that it is
susceptible to the letting of timber contracts, that in effect you are
classifying it and you are classifying it as timber that is available
for harvesting and timber available for letting.297
Conti said, in effect, that the decision not to include an area as a New Study
Area, was tantamount to releasing it for development, and that was indeed a
major federal action, deserving an EIS. Conti issued a temporary injunction
against the development of non-classified RARE lands and a full scale trial was
set for November 6, 1972.298
The Forest Service alerted its rangers of the need to adhere to the terms of the
injunction; an EIS would need to precede any development of any RARE
area.299 Meanwhile, the Forest Service contemplated the ramifications of
defending their policies in court. They decided that to contest the issue was not
in their interests, and thus they agreed to file an EIS prior to any action that
would alter the landscape of any RARE area.300 On December 11, 1972,
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Judge Conti dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case without
prejudice.301
Judge Conti's decision derailed the Forest Service's attempt to put at an end
the question of wilderness expansion. In following the purity principle, the
Forest Service excluded many areas from wilderness study consideration. By
the terms of the RARE process those areas excluded were to remain in nonwilderness multiple use management and continue to contribute to a forest's
annual allowable cut of timber. NEPA functioned to prevent these areas from
automatically falling under the axe; development could proceed only in
compliance with NEPA or the courts would intervene.
In January 1973, the Forest Service released its RARE DES. Preservationists
immediately complained of the paucity of wilderness study recommendationsonly 11 million acres out of 56 million inventoried. The Wilderness Society
and the Sierra Club decried the RARE results, noting that large tracts of
roadless lands were omitted from New Study Area status. The Wilderness
Society specifically mentioned Montana as containing large unclassified
tracts.302 The DES results for Lolo National Forest seem to substantiate the
preservationist's point. Out of 717,549 RARE acres, only two areas, Hoodoo
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(the Montana portion of the Great Burn area) and Grizzly Basin, containing a
scant 80,688 acres received New Study Area status.303
Preservationists were not the only segment of the population concerned with
the RARE results. Despite the release of the overwhelming majority of roadless
acreage to multiple use management, the timber industry expressed apprehension
over the amount of timber excluded from the annual allowable cut by the New
Study Areas. At a Missoula press conference, Jack Stevenson, President of
Intermountain Corporation in Darby, Montana, questioned whether the initial
DES classification would reduce the cut. Regional Forester Steve Yurich
replied that until the final classification there would be no reduction. When the
final classifications were set, then the Region's cut would drop 55 MMBF per
annum. Stevenson said he had no problem with the study areas as long as there
was no drop in the annual allowable cut.304 However, Jean Warren, local
Missoula representative for the Sierra Club, saw RARE as a victory for the
commodity interests. She said, "I feel what we've seen today is quite a victory
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for the miners and loggers, ... the wilderness resource has really been
lost."305
The Forest Service set an initial date of April 17, 1973 for comments on the
DES. During the review of the DES, preservationists were able to prevail upon
the Forest Service to include more areas as New Study Areas and when the new
Chief Forester, John R. McGuire, announced the results of the FES on October
15, it contained added acreage. But, McGuire knew that RARE provided little
to resolve the roadless area conflict, "The process of reconciling the many
conflicting uses, and demands, on the National Forests will no doubt take
years."306
As a result of public commentary, Lolo National Forest's
RARE New Study Area acreage more than doubled during the review of the
DES. The Forest Service added the 102,991 acre West Side Swan- Monture
area, adjacent to the west boundary of the Bob Marshall Wilderness.
Wilderness management protected the RARE study areas from extractive uses.
Raymond Karr, Information Chief for the Northern Region, said this protection
would last until the areas' final status was determined by administrative study.
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Chief of Timber Management John Milodragovich said that the Northern
Region's annual cut would shrink by 57 MMBF due to the study areas.307
As the courts moved, through NEPA, to reform federal land management
behavior, so too did Congress. The 1970s witnessed a flurry of environmentally
based legislation.308 The most significant of these new laws were the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.309 Traditionally, Congress
seldom interfered in the Forest Service's management of the national forests,
and prior to 1974 the Forest Service's basic legislative directive was the
antiquated Organic Act of 1897, as amended by the Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act of I960.310
RPA attempted to reform the longstanding budgetary woes of the Forest
Service by requiring long-term resource and budget planning. Every ten years
the Forest Service was to prepare an assessment of the status of the renewable
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resources of the nation's forests and rangelands, and every five years the Forest
Service would be responsible for a long-range resource plan with a forty-five
year horizon. Additionally, every year the agency was to produce an annual
RPA progress report. The President, in his annual budget request to Congress,
would have to submit an explanation for all funding requests not consistent with
his RPA required five-year Statement of Policy, which governs funding
requests.

i

In practice, RPA has not fundamentally changed the Forest Service's
budgetary process.312 Budget proposals and appropriations have consistently
lagged behind the goals contemplated by the required plans.313 But RPA has
served the bureaucratic purpose of deflecting criticism of Forest Service
inadequacies in funding the various multiple uses of the national forests.
Congress has the responsibility for appropriating funds for the various programs,
including wilderness management funds.314
Congress passed the National Forest Management Act to quiet the storm of
protest over Forest Service management practices in places like Montana's
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Bitterroot National Forest and West Virginia's Monongahela National Forest. In
1973, in the case West Virginia Division of the Isaak Walton League of
America, Inc. v. Butz the West Virginia Division of the Isaak Walton League of
America, Inc. sued the Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to stop the sale of
timber in the Monongahela National Forest. The Isaak Walton League claimed
that the Forest Service was in violation of the 1897 Organic Act with their
methods of harvesting timber, namely clearcutting.315
A literal reading of the Organic Act, still very much in effect in 1973,
revealed language that prohibited many Forest Service timber management
techniques. Trees had to be more than just mature enough to cut profitably,
they had to be also physically mature and prior to harvest had to be marked
individually with a slash of paint. These requirements made even-age
management by the use of the clearcutting harvest method illegal. Accordingly,
District Judge Earl Maxwell granted the League's motion for summary
judgement to enjoin all timber harvests not in compliance with the Organic
Act.316
The Forest Service appealed the decision. They claimed that to comply with
the provisions of the Organic Act would be economically impossible. U.S.
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Field wrote that the language of
the Organic Act was unambiguous; the law was clear on the methods to follow
to harvest timber. Field realized the Appellate Court's decision to affirm
Maxwell's ruling had severe consequences for the Forest Service and those
dependent on public timber. Field wrote:
We are not insensitive to the fact that our reading of the Organic
Act will have serious and far-reaching consequences, and it may
well be that this legislation enacted over seventy-five years ago is
an anachronism which no longer serves the public interest.
However, the appropriate forum to resolve this complex and
controversial issue is not the courts but the Congress.317
A year and two months after the Monongahela decision, President Gerald Ford
signed NFMA into law, on October 22, 1976.318 NFMA expanded upon the
RPA's directive to prepare land and resource plans. All contracts, permits, and
other legal instruments involving the national forests had to conform to NFMA.
NFMA guidance on timber harvesting borrows from the Church Guidelines, the
congressional response to the clearcutting controversies of 1970. NFMA
established clear limitation to the amount of timber that could be sold by the
Forest Service. Most significantly, NFMA directed that National Forest
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managers attempt to complete comprehensive 'forest plans' by 1985. NFMA
planning would come to play a distinct role in wilderness planning.319
Congressional guidance to the Forest Service in the form of legislation did not
shelter the agency from all controversy as the 1970s advanced. The old sticking
point of how to allocate the roadless areas still remained.320 As directed by
the Conti decision from 1972 to 1977 the agency processed land allocations,
both wilderness and non-wilderness, through the NEPA mandated EIS
procedure. From the Forest Service viewpoint this process proved to be slow
and tedious, and by 1977 they had allocated only five million acres of roadless
land.321
Development interests, such as the timber industry, were also frustrated at the
slowness of the allocation process. Industry needed a stable timber base on
which to base capital investments and plan for sales. These pressures, coupled
with preservationist demands for more additions to the wilderness system,
pointed toward another national attempt to resolve the roadless dilemma. This
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was speeded along when Jimmy Carter's administration assumed office in 1977
and Dr. M. Rupert Cutler received the appointment as assistant Secretary of
Agriculture for Natural Resources, the political head of the Forest Service.322
Cutler had served as a forestry professor at Michigan State University, and had
held positions in the Wilderness Society. Upon assuming his new duties in the
Cater Administration, Cutler determined to launch a new roadless area review
and evaluation that came to be called RARE II. Cutler's new inventory had two
primary goals: first, to determine which roadless and undeveloped areas to
recommend to Congress for wilderness designation; and second, identify those
areas that should be released to non-wilderness multiple use management.
Cutler set a deadline for the project's FES at the end of 1978 but he realized
that definitive decisions on all areas by that date were unrealistic. Therefore the
familiar 'study' category of 'further planning' would suffice in the areas for
which the Forest Service could not immediately make a decision.323
RARE II involved three phases: inventory; evaluation; and recommendation.
The inventory phase consisted of the identification and mapping of roadless and
undeveloped areas.324 Since the failure of the original RARE (I), the passage
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of congressionally evaluated wilderness bills, such as those establishing the
Scapegoat and Mission Mountains Wildernesses, and the recent passage of the
Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 all of which repudiated the Forest Service's
once-governing purity principle, the criteria for qualification was less severe
than in the previous inventory in 1971.325
The Forest Service encouraged public participation in the inventory phase,
even before its completion, in 227 public workshops held during the summer of
1977, 17,000 people attended. The Forest Service officially welcomed
suggestions for additions or deletions to the inventory.326 However,
preservationists criticized the Forest Service's handling of this initial public
commentary period. No evaluation of the roadless areas occurred at the
meetings; the inventories had not yet been compiled at the time of the
workshops. Preservationists complained that the input of the 17,000 attendees
served no perceptible purpose other than public relations.327
Lolo National Forest's public workshop, held on August 2, 1977, drew 150
participants to Missoula's Eagle's Hall. The Forest Service asked these people
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to provide written comments on their proposed inventory of local roadless
areas.328 In response to public demand, RARE II staffers conducted a second
workshop at Superior, Montana. At this meeting participants complained that
the Forest Service left little opportunity for verbal commentary on the
program.329
The evaluation phase's goal was to identify the "gaps" in the existing structure
of the National Wilderness Preservation System, and to fill them with
appropriate RARE II areas.330 To determine which areas were appropriate, the
Forest Service employed an agency-devised system called Wilderness Attributes
Ratings System (WARS). This evaluative system competitively rated roadless
areas by assigning a numerical score to each area. The basis for each area's
score was a sum of separate ratings of each area's wilderness attributes. These
attributes stressed those qualities identified in the Wilderness Act: natural
integrity, apparent naturalness, outstanding opportunities for solitude, primitive
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recreation, and outstanding ecological, geological, scenic, and historical
features.331
During RARE II, Forest Service officials identified 28 roadless areas in Lolo
National Forest comprising 686,000 acres. Additionally, five other areas were
added to the inventory list because they were either pending in congressional
wilderness legislation or received strong citizen support; these areas totaled
126,300 acres.332 Of these areas, those with the highest WARS ratings were
the same areas proposed for New Study Area status during RARE I; Hoodoo
(Great Burn) and the Swan-Monture. Those areas with low WARS ratings
tended to be those highest in potential timber yield.333
The final phase of RARE II, the recommendations, attempted to follow the
NEPA process. With the release of the RARE II DES on June 15, 1978, the
Forest Service provided a list of ten possible recommendation alternatives.
Roadless area allocations ranged from all areas released to non-wilderness
multiple use to all areas recommended for wilderness. One alternative proposed
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keeping the status quo, rendering RARE II invalid. Importantly, the Forest
Service did not reveal its preferred alternative in the DES.334
Preservationists were not satisfied with the Forest Service's list of alternatives
and proposed one of their own- Alternative W.335 In Montana, Alternative W
received support from the Montana Coalition for Wilderness, an umbrella group
comprised of local chapters of the Sierra Club, the Montana Wilderness
Association, and numerous smaller, local grass-roots groups. Alternative W
responded to the preservationist perception that the Forest Service's range of
alternatives were heavily slanted toward development.336
With the release of the RARE II DES, another round of public commentary
commenced. The Forest Service gave the public three and a half months to
make their final comments on RARE II.

The Montana respondents to the

RARE II DES separated into polar interest groups. A review of the letters
received at Region One Headquarters and Lolo Forest in Missoula seems to
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indicate equivalent support for wilderness and development.
Representative of the polarity of opinion, the Montana League of Women
Voters wrote to urge the Forest Service to consider the economic and
environmental costs of developing roadless areas. Also, echoing the concern of
the Sierra Club, the League decried the lack of an adequate period for
considering public opinion.337 In an opposing viewpoint, the Montana 4x4
Association, Inc., wrote to Lolo Forest urging the adoption of the alternative that
allocated all roadless areas for non-wilderness use.338
The University of Montana hosted a national conference on RARE II, held on
August 4 through the 5, 1978. The National RARE II Symposium saw such
notables as Assistant-Secretary of Agriculture M. Rupert Cutler, Chief Forester
John McGuire, and Congressman Max Baucus (then also candidate for the U.S.
Senate) in attendance. The conference brought together the widely disparate
interests involved in the RARE II process, including the administration,
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Congress, industry, academia, and conservationists, to discuss the DES and the
general progress of RARE II.339
Presenting the congressional perspective on RARE II, Max Baucus stressed the
importance of basing land allocation decisions on the effects those decisions
have on people. Baucus noted the demands of competing resource interests on a
growing scarcity of resources. Wilderness could not be separated from the other
related forest issues according to Baucus, and the RARE II process had to
address the problems of scarcity and competition for resources. The soon to be
senator (who would replace wilderness champion Lee Metcalf) offered no
concrete opinion on the potential success of RARE II but said expectations that
RARE II would solve the entire national roadless area issue in "one fell swoop"
were unrealistic.340
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dirty" attempts to resolve the roadless areas' fate. Scott interpreted the
preoccupation with rapidity as an effort to get back to the business of
development.341
Speaking for development interests, William Mote, a geologist from the
Northwest Mining Association, appealed to national security concerns for the
necessity of developing Western public lands. Stating that the United States
imported more than half its annual requirement of 18 (unspecified) critical, nonfuel minerals, Mote noted the existence of many of those critical minerals on
Forest Service land. He stressed the danger of relying on foreign sources (1978
saw OPEC limit oil supplies to the U.S., resulting in the infamous gas lines) and
the essential need for home supplies. Mote conceded the wisdom of preserving
"truly outstanding wilderness," but emphasized the need to quantify that
outstanding wilderness and return the remaining national forest roadless areas to
multiple use.342
Once the time allocated for public commentary on the DES expired, the Forest
Service went to work producing the FES. This document arrived, on schedule,
in January, 1979. Contained in the FES were the agency's recommendations to
congress for the roadless areas. The preferred allocations emphasized high
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resource outputs while adding to the wilderness system those areas with the
highest WARS ratings. Nationally, this translated into 624 areas with
15,088,838 acres recommended for wilderness, 1,981 areas with 36,151,558
acres for non-wilderness, and 314 areas with 10,796,508 acres for further
planning.343
In Montana, the Forest Service recommended 35 areas totaling 603,381 acres
for wilderness and 28 areas with 1,300,614 acres received further planning
status. Non-wilderness roadless areas released to non-wilderness multiple use
totaled 158 with 3,437,044 acres.344 Six Lolo National Forest areas received
recommendations for wilderness: a Bob Marshall addition, Schley Mountain
and Hoodoo (Great Burn), Clearwater-Monture, Quigg, and Dunham Point.
These areas totaled 246,351 acres representing the creation of two new
wildernesses, the Great Burn and Sliderock (Quigg), plus additions to the Bob
Marshall complex and Selway-Bitterroot. One area just north of Missoula, the
Rattlesnake, received further planning status.345
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The FES proposed to President Jimmy Carter the legislative designation of
wilderness for those areas recommended for wilderness. Non-wilderness area
selections were to be released to non-wilderness multiple use management by
April 15, 1979. Lands that fell into the further planning category were to
remain essentially undeveloped until individual forest planning, under the
provisions of NFMA, decided their ultimate fate.346
Front page headlines announced the release of the RARE II FES in Missoula
on January 5, 1979. Missoulian writer Don Schwennesen interpreted the results
of RARE II as a victory for wilderness opponents because the FES supported
the release of two-thirds of the nation's roadless areas to non-wilderness
use.347 Preservation groups blasted RARE II and the Forest Service. John
Piatt, Executive Director of the Oregon Environmental Council, expressed
extreme disappointment over the results. The Sierra Club's Doug Scott frankly
stated, "RARE II decisions in the Pacific Northwest are the worst in the nation."
Doug Jones, of Friends of the Earth, questioned the motives of the program,
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claiming that "most of the areas proposed for wilderness have never been
available [for resource development] anyway."348
On April 16, 1979, after two and a half months of public review of the Final
EIS, President Carter released his formal recommendation to Congress.
Deviating little from the RARE II FES, Carter recommended 15.4 million acres
for wilderness, 36 million acres for non-wilderness, and 10.6 million acres for
further planning. Calling RARE II a "comprehensive nationwide review and
evaluation" Carter hoped that his recommendations would end the controversy
over the fate of the roadless lands.349
Yet, far from ending the controversy, the RARE II Final EIS stirred up a
hornet's nest of opposition from preservationists, Congress, and state
government officials. Representing developers, Congressman Thomas J. Foley,
Democrat from Washington, tried twice to get pro-development wilderness
legislation passed. First, Foley introduced The National Forest Multiple Use
Management Act of 1980. This act proposed the immediate release of the 36
million acres of roadless land not recommended for wilderness by RARE II.
Additionally, those areas in the further planning category that had not had their
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status resolved by January 1, 1985, reverted to multiple use planning. Foley's
bill had 54 co-sponsors and that was about all the support it received.350
Foley tried again with a second bill, a revision of his failed first, called the
National Forest Roadless Areas Act. A compromise with preservationists,
Foley's second bill would have immediately conferred wilderness designations
on the areas selected for wilderness by RARE II. Areas not selected for
wilderness passed into non-wilderness multiple use planning. House of
Representatives forces sympathetic to the preservationist cause also rejected
Foley's second bill.351
As the RARE II EIS became the topic of discussion among those interested in
public lands issues, the state of California explored the possibility of judicial
action to reverse the roadless area allocations of RARE II. Once again, NEPA
would be used by preservationists to suspend temporarily an unpopular federal
land management program. When RARE II failed to withstand the rigors of
judicial review, future wilderness expansion was left to individual state
congressional delegations and in Montana, this process has ground down into
stagnation.

Congress and the courts continued to influence wilderness policy
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country in America.352 The wilderness debate polarized between two
philosophically opposed groups, environmentalists and a new, grassroots activist
impulse- the utilitarian wise use movement.353 Caught in the middle of the
political crossfire stood the U.S. Forest Service.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Judicial Critique, Congressional Stalemate,
and Polarization

Congress and the courts continued to influence wilderness policy during the
1980s. As the conservative Reagan administration assumed office,
environmentalists prepared to wage battle for the last remaining vestiges of wild
country in America.354 The wilderness debate polarized between two
philosophically opposed groups, environmentalists and a new, grassroots activist
impulse- the utilitarian Wise Use movement. Caught in the middle of the
political crossfire stood the U.S. Forest Service.
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture M. Rupert Cutler stated two goals for
RARE II in 1977: to complete the National Wilderness Preservation system for
the national forests, and to release those areas not selected for wilderness to
multiple use management.355 With the distribution of the RARE II FES,
wilderness advocates expressed deep dissatisfaction with the results. Far from
resolving the future of wilderness allocation, RARE II produced a renewed
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effort from preservationists to save the remaining wild places. The Wilderness
Society called for pressure on Congress; the State of California sued to enjoin
the release of designated non-wilderness areas in that state; and in Montana, a
grass-roots wilderness group struggled to designate a unique wilderness, just
north of the Missoula city limits.356
RARE II occurred during a period of much activity in the process of land
management planning. While the national roadless inventory proceeded, the
Forest Service continued with RPA and National Forest Management Act
(NFMA) planning, and Congress furthered separate wilderness legislation.
According to one land management study, RARE II contributed "another layer
of confusion" to the forest planning process.357 To complicate matters further,
with California's decision to sue the Forest Service in California v.
Bergland358, the judiciary entered the picture, under the familiar pretext of the
now familiar National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Looking back, the Forest Service's record with NEPA and wilderness issues
was not outstanding. RARE I had died in Sierra Club v. Butz. In Wyoming
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Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, (1973) the court had enjoined two
valuable timber sales; and in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,
(1974), the court had issued an injunction to halt logging adjacent to a
wilderness area. These cases revolved around the Forest Service's inadequate
preparation of environmental impact statements. One might assume that by the
time of RARE II the service would have ascertained the complexities of Section
102,(2),(C), but in 1980 a federal district court discovered that the service still
had much to discover.
California's main point of contention in California v. Bergland centered on the
Forest Service's alleged failure [to] "critically examine" the effect of its
decisions on the wilderness quality of the RARE II areas. District Judge
Lawrence Karlton replied to the California allegation,
My examination of the RARE II environmental statement has
convinced me that the Forest service either never seriously
considered the impact of its decision on the wilderness qualities of
the RARE II areas, or that the Forest Service has simply failed to
disclose the data, assumptions, and conclusions employed by it in
such a consideration.359
Judge Karlton further criticized the RARE II EIS for not revealing what the
service was to sacrifice (in terms of land) by releasing the preponderance of
acreage to non-wilderness uses.360
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the impact of a non-wilderness designation on an area, the proposed action still
had to constitute a major federal action in order for NEPA to apply. Defining a
major federal action as one that changed the status quo, Judge Karlton held that
RARE definitely qualified as a major federal action.361 Indeed, the Forest
Service never questioned the applicability of NEPA to RARE II.
NEPA's Section 102, (2), (C), directs agencies to include in their EISs a list of
alternatives to the proposed action.362 Judge Karlton recalled how the courts
had found the duty to include alternatives as the "lynch pin" of the whole
impact statement.363 Indeed, Judge Wright, in his Calvert Cliffs opinion, had
found that using alternatives was the only way "the most intelligent, optimally
beneficial decision will ultimately be made."364

The RARE II EIS listed 11

alternative courses of action. One alternative proposed to put all the Roadless
areas into wilderness and the other ten proposed some form of development.
Judge Karlton found the list heavily "skewed" toward non-wilderness options.
He concluded that the Forest Service had "acted arbitrarily in its restriction of
the range of alternatives."365 The all-wilderness option that the Forest Service
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relied upon to demonstrate that they considered a "broad range" of alternatives
was neither serious nor acceptable under NEPA.366
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the content of the RARE II EIS
centered on the methodology of the evaluation of roadless areas. The Forest
Service devised its rating system, WARS, to rate competitively individual
roadless tracts. WARS assigned a numerical score to each area, with only the
highest scores even considered for wilderness designation.367
Judge Karlton found WARS to be deficient under NEPA; WARS did not
supply the type of analysis required by the legislation. The courts interpreted
NEPA to require that agencies take a "hard look" at their proposed actions, and
the RARE II EIS did not accomplish the hard look. According to Judge
Karlton, WARS "utterly failed" to consider the impact of a non-wilderness
recommendation. Judge Karlton even found fault with the terminology used by
the Forest Service to describe landforms. The terms used in the comments
section on the WARS worksheet were too vague, inspiring a humorous footnote
in the opinion: "One can hypothesize how the Grand Canyon might be rated:
'Canyon with river, little vegetation'."368
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RARE II betrayed a not too subtle bias toward resource production, according
to the opinion in California v. Bergland. The EIS failed to address the impact
of the decision not to classify an area as wilderness. However, the EIS spoke
volumes about the costs of foreclosing development.369 The Calvert Cliffs
opinion had clearly announced that compliance with NEPA involved a balanced
analysis of all factors370 yet the RARE II EIS never addressed the values lost
or gained by the decision to develop a roadless area. NEPA demands full
disclosure and full consideration of environmental factors.371 The Forest
Service published instead a resource commodities report.
Critical to Judge Karlton's rejection of the RARE II EIS was the lack of site
specific analysis of the individual areas. The EIS contained just the numerical
WARS ratings for each area listed in a computer print-out format. Forest
Service counsel defended the EIS by arguing that if the agency included a
written analysis of each RARE II area, the final document would be too
"bulky."372 The judge's response: "A statutory duty cannot be excused simply
because it is difficult to perform."373 The resultant difficulty in providing a
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site-specific EIS was not due to the statute but to the scope of the project that
the Forest Service voluntarily took upon itself.374
California also charged that the public commentary process on the RARE II
EIS violated NEPA. The state raised three objections: first, the Forest Service
failed to afford the public an opportunity to comment on the final EIS that
contained the Forest service's recommendations375; second, the Forest Service
never responded to site specific comments on the draft EIS, and third, the Forest
Service changed its method of evaluating comments after the draft EIS376,
NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines contemplated a
reasonable opportunity for public commentary on proposed federal actions;377
Judge Karlton found that the RARE II EIS was at variance with this directive
and held the California objections valid.
As interpreted by the courts, the RARE II EIS contained serious flaws and was
beyond salvation. Accordingly, Judge Karlton granted a motion for an
injunction against the development of the forty-seven non-wilderness areas in

374Ibid.
375The

Forest Service received public comments only on the draft EIS,
which did not contain any land use recommendations. The final EIS that did
contain the recommendations had a limited circulation to mostly government
entities, so the public never had a chance to comment on the specific proposals.
376483

F. Supp. at 493.

377Ibid.

163

California. Full compliance, including an adequate assessment of the wilderness
values in a site specific analysis, had to occur before such development could
proceed.378 RARE II, in California, suffered the same fate as its predecessor,
RARE I.
As a federal district court dramatically identified the differences between
RARE II and NEPA, a Montana wilderness example illustrated the differences
in wilderness perception between RARE II and the Forest Service, the public,
and the Congress. In the fall of 1974, newly retired Forest Service official
William R. (Bud) Moore decided to spend his first winter of retirement trapping
in the Welcome Creek drainage of the Sapphire Mountains. While on his
trapping expedition, Moore maintained a journal that eventually would help
establish a wilderness area.
Welcome Creek was a roadless island in patchwork of clearcut developments
in Lolo National Forest's southeastern section. Topographically not as
spectacular as many existing wildernesses, such as the Bob Marshall, Welcome
Creek's 28,000 acres featured forested ridges, steep slopes, rushing waters, rock
outcrops and cliffs.379 Welcome Creek was most widely known as a tributary
of the famous trout fishery, Rock Creek. The Forest Service had ignored

378483

F. Supp. at 502.

379Steve

Woodruff and Don Schwennesen, Montana Wilderness: Discovering
the Heritage, (Kansas City: The Lowell Press, 1984), 71.

164

Welcome Creek during RARE I because of a ten-year old timber sale in the
area and the presence of an intruding road in the area's northeastern section.380
Nonetheless, a minor controversy developed over the Forest Service's neglect
of Welcome Creek during RARE I.381 Bud Moore remembers people
repeatedly asking him his opinion of the area as interest in the roadless
character of the creek drainage increased.382 By 1974, Moore's fascination in
Welcome Creek was aroused sufficiently to convince him to make a September
scouting of the area's potential for fur trapping. Moore's reconnaissance turned
up much evidence of small fur-bearing mammals such as marten and bobcat,
and thus he decided to trap Welcome Creek that winter.383
When Moore began laying his trapline through the Welcome Creek drainage,
he noticed the tell-tale signs of impending timber harvest. Cruisers had left the
distinctive paint slashes on trees, marking not only harvestable timber
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boundaries but also road locations to support the harvest. Moore then conceived
of his trip as more than a trapping venture; he kept detailed journals of his
winter in Welcome Creek and thought his observations of the biotic diversity
within the creek's natural setting might help the Forest Service to "step back"
and reconsider their timber harvest plans.384
Though lacking in towering peaks and reflective lakes, Welcome Creek
displayed a unique wild nature to Bud Moore. He wrote in his journal:
Because Welcome Creek's canyon walls are steep, fall and winter
sun rarely brighten its bottom land. Except for the creek's
energetic music, I hiked alone in silence deepened by the
mountain's shadow. Each intimate twist in the trail. . .there are
many . . . opened sudden new vistas, mini worlds they were, each
different than the last, expanding ahead then closing behind a rock
point or a giant spruce tree as I ambled on through the spell of
evening hush.385
Moore's journal continually argues for land managers to consider the natural
elements in their planning decisions:
I got to wondering if the timber marking foresters ever feel, as I
do, that with each stroke of the paint gun the loggers are not only
authorized to take wood out of the mountains but something
priceless is lost forever.386
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His descriptions of Welcome Creek are cast against the impending destruction
caused by future commodity extraction. More than timber harvest threatened
the wildness of Welcome Creek. Welcome Creek, historically, supported
mining activity. Moore suggested ways to make future mineral extraction
compatible with the wild character of Welcome Creek. He observed:
But what of the placer gold claims staked out along the creek?
Given the mining history of the land, these somehow seem to fit
into the scheme of an interesting future. If and when they're
worked, mud would flow in the creek as it did during the big gold
mining operations years ago. But this could be minimized by
settling ponds near the sluice boxes.
The key it seems to me, is to keep the big machinery out of here
when mining. Mining by hand would be tolerable with wild
values here. It would, in fact, rekindle the rich history of
yesteryear and add a new dimension to the Welcome Creek
3R7
experience.
Moore's journal, and the subsequent report he wrote based on his journals,
painted a picture of the creek's distinct wildness; the Welcome Creek drainage
was a roadless area not deemed worthy by the Forest Service for consideration
as wilderness. Even Moore did not originally support statutory wilderness
designation for Welcome Creek, as his ideas on allowing mining indicate.
Instead, he advocated some form of special management status that would allow
for minor commodity extraction while preserving the drainage's essential nature.
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Moore took his report to Regional Forester Steve Yurich who paid little
attention to it as he believed the timber sales should proceed.388
The professional wilderness advocates, however, gave Moore's report great
attention. First, Clifton Merritt called Moore to obtain a copy, and later
Montana Wilderness Society representative Bill Cunningham received a copy.
Moore's report fit in nicely with a new legislative measure in Washington, D.C.
Wilderness advocates and sympathetic Congressional members, such as Lee
Metcalf and California Congressman Philip Burton had drafted a bill to protect a
number of western roadless areas as statutory wilderness. This multi-state
omnibus bill, the Endangered American Wilderness Act, originally contained
three Montana areas selected by Bill Cunningham: MacGregor-Thompson and
Welcome Creek in Lolo National Forest and Mount Henry in Kootenai National
Forest.389
Moore's report had inspired Bill Cunningham to seek congressional support
for the area's inclusion in the Endangered Wilderness bill. Another influential
person in providing site-specific data on Welcome Creek, and instrumental in
the area's successful designation, was University of Montana wildlife biology
professor and Director of the Wilderness Institute, Bob Ream. Ream supplied
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key data on elk in the Welcome Creek drainage that helped to sway
• •
390
opinion.

By 1977, however, Welcome Creek ran into trouble from Congressman Max
Baucus. Baucus opposed Welcome Creek's inclusion in the Endangered
American Wilderness Act because he had pledged his support to another
Montana wilderness bill, the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977.391
Baucus forced the deletion of the three Montana wilderness proposals while the
Endangered American Wilderness Act was in subcommittee.392
However, Welcome Creek benefitted from the usual animosities inherent in the
Congress. California's Philip Burton was no friend of Max Baucus, and when
the Endangered Wilderness bill reached the full Interior Committee, Burton
amended the bill to include Welcome Creek. In a twist of political discourse,
Montana's Republican Representative from the eastern district, who was no
supporter of preservationist measures, Ron Marlenee supported Welcome
Creek's inclusion. Marlenee hoped to embarrass Baucus, and Welcome Creek
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stands as the only wilderness designation supported by Ron Marlenee during his
long tenure in office.393
Baucus did not discover that he had been politically outmaneuvered until the
Endangered American Wilderness Act reached the floor of the House. When
the bill reached the floor, the regular House rules were suspended, offering no
chance of amendment. Baucus was livid; he said he would have offered an
amendment to remove Welcome Creek if the rules had been in effect. Baucus
then reiterated his opposition to the Welcome Creek Wilderness:
Mr. Speaker, it is true that I did object to it, and that there were
two contestants. It is true that there is one area that was included
within the First District of Montana, and I think that area should
not be included. The full committee did include that portion.394
Custom dictates, in wilderness politics, that the congressional delegation of a
state in which there is a wilderness recommendation approve an area's inclusion
into the National Wilderness Preservation System. Rarely is this protocol
breached, or if so, usually only over the objections of a minority party
representative. Yet Baucus was a member of the majority Democratic party and
he opposed a wilderness area located in his own district. Nevertheless, with the
rules suspended, Baucus was helpless to prevent Welcome Creek's inclusion in
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the bill. Baucus voted for the Endangered American Wilderness Act anyway,
and on September 12, 1977, the House passed the bill.395
Concurrent with the congressional debate over the Endangered American
Wilderness Act was the Forest Service's RARE II. Due to administrative
support, Welcome Creek was included in this inventory.396 However, the
Forest Service rated the area low in its WARS summary, giving it only a 19, a
low score indicating that through the RARE II recommendation process,
Welcome Creek lacked any chance of recommendation.397 Welcome Creek's
WARS rating indicated that the purity principle still exerted some influence on
Forest Service wilderness policy and Welcome Creek's extractive potential.
Forest Service plans to develop Welcome Creek were thwarted on February
24, 1978, when President Carter signed the Endangered American Wilderness
Act into law. The act specified that the national interest required that lands
such as Welcome Creek be protected from the pressures of a "growing
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population" and increasing "large-scale and industrial growth."398 To
preservationists, the symbolic value of Welcome Creek was as a demonstration
that statutory wilderness, ultimately, would not be determined by programs like
RARE II but by the Congress.399 Wilderness did not have to be rocks and ice,
or spectacular scenery, but could encompass a more subtle and diverse ecology.
Despite the Endangered American Wilderness Act, Judge Karlton's
decision in California v. Bergland, and public discontent, the Forest Service
attempted to salvage RARE II by appealing to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, Congress began enacting statewide wilderness bills based
on RARE II. In Colorado and New Mexico, state bills passed in 1980. These
enactments contained 'sufficiency' language- a congressional declaration that the
RARE II EIS was sufficient for roadless area disposition in the states affected
by the legislation. Most importantly, the Colorado and New Mexico bills had
provisions written-in to preclude judicial review of the RARE II EIS for those
states' bills.400
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Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the renamed California v.
Block401 reviewed the district court's findings that the RARE II final EIS did
not contain a site specific analysis, that the EIS did not consider a sufficient
number of alternatives, and that the public had an inadequate opportunity to
comment on the project.402
On the question of site specificity, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.
They agreed that the Forest Service had failed to conduct a "hard look" in their
EIS. Moreover, the circuit court sustained the district's finding of undue bias
toward resource production and an inadequate discussion of the implications of
a non-wilderness designation. In summary, to refute the Forest Service's claim
that site specificity was unfairly burdensome, Circuit Judge Tang said,
We concede that conducting a detailed site specific analysis of the
RARE II decision will be no simple task . . . The scope of
undertaking here, however was the Forest Service's choice and not
the courts'. NEPA contains no exemptions for projects of national
scope.403
The Ninth Circuit also confirmed the other two points on appeal, alternatives
and commentary. On alternatives, the circuit declared that, [the EIS] uncritically
assumes that a substantial portion of the RARE II areas should be developed
401690
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. . . ."404 An obvious barb to the resource production bias of RARE II, Circuit
Judge Tang called the range of alternative actions presented by the EIS
"unreasonable."405
The requirements for public commentary prompted the district court to adopt a
standard of "clearly articulated" in relation to the proposed action presented to
the public. The Ninth Circuit, however, found this a standard that would
produce an endless series of EISs even for minor adjustments in the original
plan. This was too extreme, and therefore the court rejected the district's
standard.406 Instead, the circuit applied its own public commentary standard.
This standard directed that,
An impact statement should provide the public with information on
the environmental impact of a proposed project as well as
encourage public participation in the development of that
information.407
Judged against this standard, the circuit court concluded that the Forest Service,
by withholding the final recommendation until the final EIS and thereby
shielding the recommendation from public scrutiny, violated NEPA. Also found
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insufficient was the service's response to the public's site specific
commentary.408
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's substantial affirmation of Judge Karlton's
California v. Bergland opinion extended the injunction of the development of
RARE II areas to the entire Ninth Circuit jurisdiction, which covered much of
the West including Montana and therefore most of the roadless areas.
California v. Block essentially rendered the objectives of RARE II invalid. As
in Colorado and New Mexico, wilderness designation would have to go to
Congress on an individual state-by-state basis; there would be no grand
nationwide bill. Furthermore, the experiences of the Forest Service in the courts
over NEPA provided a powerful indication that the courts would examine
roadless areas' EISs very closely 409
Thus in the post-Wilderness Act era, the most successful methods of
expanding the National Wilderness Preservation System became multi-state
omnibus bills (multiple areas in multiple states designated as wilderness) and
single-area bills. Representative of the latter method and of the new power of
grass-roots activism in achieving statutory wilderness designation under these
revised conditions, is the story of the enactment of the Rattlesnake Wilderness.
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Situated less than five miles north of Missoula's city limits, the Rattlesnake
Mountains were unique as a roadless area. An almost complete ecosystem, the
Rattlesnake featured a full array of animal life, including top predators such as
wolves and grizzly bears. Combined with steep slopes, 8,000 feet high peaks,
glaciated topography, and cold, clear waters, this wilderness existed in a
somewhat primitive state because of the Rattlesnake Creek drainage's value as
Missoula's water supply.410
The two main landowners of the Rattlesnake drainage were the Montana
Power Company and the Forest Service. In the early part of the twentieth
century, the area contained numerous homesteads, and early settlers built timber
and rock dams in the high country for water supply. Montana Power bought
20,000 acres of the drainage to safeguard its investment in local water business.
In the 1950s, the company decided to log some of its holdings in the
Rattlesnake. A road was constructed along Rattlesnake Creek that climbed back
into the forested slopes. Tributary sites along the upper creek were clearcut, and
timber came rolling down the access road. Public criticism and the exhaustion
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of the easily harvested commercial timber forced the company to suspend
further developments.411
After the 1950s development, the Rattlesnake became a popular recreation spot
for local people, especially those who preferred motorized recreation such as
snowmobiles and motorcycles. As increasing litter, trails and conflicts between
hikers and riders developed during the 1960s and early 1970s, a local grass
roots protective group formed called, Friends of the Rattlesnake. This group
included notable conservationist Arnold Bolle, and sought originally to regulate
the competing recreation uses. Later, under the leadership of Cass Chinske, it
came to support wilderness designation for the area412
The Forest Service inventoried the Rattlesnake roadless area during both
RARE programs. Rattlesnake rated a meager 21 on the WARS scale during
RARE II, suggesting that the checkerboard land ownership patterns and the
substantial evidence of human activity precluded the area from wilderness
designation.413 When the RARE II DES was released, Rattlesnake generated
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more public commentary than any other area in the Northern Region.414
Friends of the Rattlesnake worked closely with interested citizens in Missoula to
provide over 700 written site-specific comments on the Rattlesnake.415
In 1979 the final recommendations of the Forest Service's RARE II program
gave the Rattlesnake a 'further planning' recommendation 416 This meant that
the area would be reevaluated for its future status during the forest planning
(NFMA) process. This recommendation focused the Friends of the
Rattlesnake's determination to pursue statutory wilderness protection. Within
the organization, wilderness advocates such as Arnold Bolle and Cass Chinske
took over leadership, while original President Joe Musselman left the group
because he opposed statutory protection417
One of the big problems with wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake was
the checkerboard land ownership pattern. Chinske proposed to Montana Power
Company's Board of Directors either a land purchase or trade with the Forest
Service. Chairman of the Board Joe McElwain responded to Chinske and the
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Friends that the Montana Power Company would like to sell its Rattlesnake
holdings to the Forest Service for protection as wilderness. Especially enticing
to McElwain was the hefty congressional purchase appropriation.418
The Friends of the Rattlesnake now turned to the ultimate arbiters of what
constitutes wilderness- the U.S. Congress. Bolle and Chinske contacted
freshman Congressman Pat Williams for support; since Williams had earlier
expressed support for wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake. Missoula's
unique collection of wilderness interests and the proximity of the Rattlesnake
roadless area to those interests attracted Williams to the idea of establishing a
wilderness educational center along with wilderness protection419
The Friends of the Rattlesnake worked to build a solid local consensus behind
the idea of statutory wilderness protection for the Rattlesnake. Along with the
support of the Montana Power Company, local government officials, University
of Montana professors and students, a large proportion of Missoula's residents
expressed support for a Rattlesnake Wilderness 420 Timber industry opposition
was de-fused by Lolo National Forest Supervisor Orville Daniels's testimony
admitted Rattlesnake timber was an insignificant part of Lolo National Forest's
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overall timber base.421 Only the motorcycle groups stood as organized
opposition.
Pat Williams introduced a wilderness bill for the Rattlesnake on November 14,
1979, but was unable to advance it before the Christmas congressional break.
Williams promised passage of a wilderness bill in 1980. During that interval,
motorcyclists, operating as an organization called Rattlesnake Access
Committee, approached Montana Senator John Melcher with a petition signed
by 3,000 people opposing shutting off the Rattlesnake from motorized access.
Melcher introduced a competing bill in the Senate that reserved an eight-mile
access corridor along the old logging road along Rattlesnake Creek. Besides
creating the 'Melcher Corridor', the Senate bill eliminated Williams's education
center.422
Melcher's amended proposal for the Rattlesnake earned him the lasting enmity
of preservationists.423 His Rattlesnake plan would designate the northern
30,000 acres of the drainage as wilderness with the southern section managed as
a National Recreation Area along with the access corridor penetrating eight
miles into the wilderness area. The bill provided for the purchase of the
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Montana Power Company holdings, along with other land exchanges to
consolidate the Rattlesnake in federal ownership.424
Williams's bill passed the House on September 23, 1980, without the Melcher
Corridor and including the education center. Two days later, and ahead of
schedule, Melcher put his bill before the Senate Energy Committee. All sides
wanted the Rattlesnake legislation wrapped-up prior to the general election of
1980; no one wanted to face the uncertainty of the brief post-election
congressional session. Williams and Melcher met on October 1 to work out a
compromise. Williams conceded his education center, but Melcher remained
firm on the access corridor and yielded only a small 3,500 acre transfer from the
recreation area to wilderness. Williams reported the compromise to Arnold
Bolle and asked for an opinion; Bolle decided something was better than
nothing and told Williams to go ahead.425
President Carter signed the Rattlesnake Recreation Area and Wilderness Act of
1980 on October 21, 1980. The Rattlesnake became perhaps the most unique
component in the National Wilderness Preservation System primarily because of
its proximity to the urban enclave of Missoula. The Wilderness area afforded
statutory protection to an area complete with rugged and scenic terrain, but also
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a diverse community of animal life- and all within a short hike from the
Missoula city limits. The Rattlesnake represented a people's wilderness based
on a community consensus and again, Forest Service management plans had
been thwarted by popular will.426
RARE II's nullification in the Block decision led to wilderness
recommendations coming from the state congressional delegations. Most
Western states followed the lead of Colorado and New Mexico and worked fast
to resolve the roadless area issue. Montana and Idaho, however were unable to
achieve a quick-fix to the fate of de facto wilderness existing in their national
forests. While the wilderness debate in Montana polarized along familiar lines,
wilderness planning and management reverted to the Forest Service and its
NFMA forest planning process.
Lolo National Forest planners conducted a re-inventory of all roadless lands
within their forest's boundaries in 1983, as part of the NFMA forest planning
process. Originally, planners relied upon the RARE II recommendations for
roadless area planning purposes: However, the Block decision forced another
assessment of the roadless areas' wilderness potential 427 Included in the 1983
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4270rville

with Cass Chinske.

Daniels, "Roadless Area Inventory: Lolo National Forest," Forest
Service Information Packet, September 8, 1983, RARE II Files, Headquarters
Lolo National Forest, Missoula, MT.
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inventory were former Unit Plan roadless areas that were excluded from the
RARE II inventory 428 With the addition of the Unit Plan areas, and
accounting for the changes in acreage in the RARE II areas in the six years
since that inventory, the 1983 inventory was not a replica of RARE II.
The 1983 inventory reported 776,190 national forest roadless acres in Lolo
National Forest. Unit Plan areas, such as the Petty Mountain Roadless Area
(nearly 17,000 acres) west of Missoula, added to the total acres. Some areas,
such as MacGregor-Thompson, located northwest of Missoula, were reduced by
over 22,000 acres, as a result of timber harvest since RARE II.429

Besides

recalculating acreage, the 1983 inventory recommended wilderness disposition
for the upcoming forest plan.
After going through the NEPA mandated requirements, in 1986 Lolo National
Forest released its Forest Plan. The Forest Plan recommended 289,220 acres of
new wilderness for Lolo National Forest (a 44,000 acre increase over RARE II
recommendations) in basically the same geographic locations- Great Burn, Bob
Marshall additions, and Quigg Mountain (located in the Rock creek drainage).

428Planning

conducted prior to NFMA was consolidated in Unit Plans, which
were geographically categorized. Some Unit Plan areas contained roadless
acreage and technically were managed according to the Unit Plan and thus
exempted from RARE II.
429United

States Forest Service, Northern Region, "Roadless Area Inventory
Report, April 25, 1984," Wilderness, Recreation, and Cultural Resources Office,
Northern Region Headquarters, Missoula, MT.
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These new proposed wilderness areas were to be managed in a manner that
would preserve their wilderness characteristics until Congress decided their
ultimate fate. An additional 169,982 acres of roadless land was placed in
Management Area 11, a roadless management allocation code, under standards
less restrictive than wilderness. The Forest Plan released the rest of the
inventoried roadless acreage to various forms of development, including road
construction and timber harvest.430
As indicated by the Block decision and in the forest plans, Congress would
decide the future of the roadless areas in state-by-state wilderness bills.
Montana's congressional delegation introduced ten separate wilderness bills
between June 1984 and September 1991 431 All ten bills failed to become
law, and as of April 1993, Montana lacks legislation governing the final
disposition of its roadless forested lands.432 Meanwhile, the individual
national forest plans continue to manage the roadless areas.

430United

States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Lolo National
Forest, "Plan, February, 1986," III-32-III-55; United States Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service, Lolo National Forest, "The Lolo National Forest
Plan: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Appendices."
431The

last national forest wilderness area established in Montana was the
259,000 acre Lee Metcalf Wilderness Area, located in the Beaverhead and
Gallatin National Forests in 1983, as a single area bill.
432Tom

Donahue, Recreation Specialist for Northern Region, to author,
March 23, 1993.
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Standard post-RARE II wilderness politics require the unified support of the
state's congressional delegation to pass a wilderness bill. In 1984, this
consensus approach produced the proposed Montana Wilderness Act of
1984.433 The 1984 bill closely resembled a typical RARE II bill, complete
with RARE II sufficiency language for the state of Montana. Areas not
designated as wilderness, or as special management areas were released to the
forest plans, and the Forest Service was precluded from considering them for
wilderness without the approval of Congress. The 1984 proposal designated
747,178 acres of new wilderness in Montana. For Lolo National Forest there
were to be two new wildernesses: Great Burn, 91,600 acres; Quigg Mountain,
44,160 acres; and the Bob Marshall Complex additions, 139,560 acres plus a
small Selway-Bitterroot addition at 3,700 acres.434
Since the 1984 bill so closely resembled the RARE II recommendations,
preservationists took the lead in opposing the bill. During the early 1980s,
polarization occurred not only between preservationists and utilitarians, but also
within the preservationist community. Increasingly, environmental groups, such
as the Montana Wilderness Association, opposed the congressional consensus
formula, which to them seemed automatically to produce bad wilderness

433Naegele,
434United

25.

States Senate 98th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Wilderness Act
of 1984," S.2850, June 29, 1984.
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legislation.435 Consensus politics required compromise- indeed compromise
generally reflects the entire history of statutory wilderness, but many groups
opposed compromise because it meant that certain areas would be excluded
from protection as a matter of course.
The 1984 Wilderness Act went nowhere in the 98th Congress. For Baucus,
1984 was an election year and he was in no mood to press an unpopular
bill 436 The next attempt at a Montana bill occurred in 1986, initiated by
Melcher. This bill designated over a million acres as wilderness, including the
Great Burn and Quigg in Lolo National Forest. Sufficiency and release
language in the 1986 bill closely parallelled the 1984 legislation. Again, like its
predecessor, Melcher's 1986 Montana Wilderness Act perished in the halls of
Congress 437
Montana came closest to a successful wilderness bill in 1988. In the summer
of 1987, Senator Max Baucus and Representative Pat Williams introduced bills
into both houses of Congress. By 1987, the consensus approach no longer
restrained the Montana congressional delegation, with the exception of Melcher.
Baucus fired first with his Senate bill designating 1,324,000 acres of wilderness

435Interview
436Naegele,
437United

with Bill Cunningham, February 1, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.

25; Interview with Bill Cunningham.

States Senate, 99th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Wilderness
Act of 1986," S.2790, August 15, 1986.

186

with standard sufficiency and release language configurations.438 Williams
introduced his own bill in the House, and by October it passed with nearly
identical acreage slated for wilderness439
Senator Melcher opposed the Baucus bill in the Senate in 1987. By 1988,
Melcher faced a reelection campaign, and attempted to craft the Baucus, and
Williams, bills to suit his need to appear in control of the issue during his
campaign. Melcher nit-picked on acreage that increased during the BaucusWilliams negotiations by 100,000 acres; Melcher wanted the original 1.3 million
designation. With time running out on the 100th Congress in October 1988,
Melcher drew up his version of the Baucus-Williams bills and rammed it
through the Senate and House before the November election.440
What Melcher had failed to consider in his mad dash for a wilderness bill in
1988 was the possibility of a presidential veto. As part of Republican strategy
to defeat Melcher and replace him with conservative challenger Conrad Burns,
President Ronald Reagan, no friend of wilderness designations, pocket-vetoed

438United

States Senate, 100th Congress; 1st Session, "Montana Natural
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1987," S.1478, July 9, 1987.
439United

States Senate, 100th Congress, 1st Session, "Montana Natural
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1987," H.R. 2090, October 15,
1987.
'^United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Natural
Resources Protection and Utilization Act of 1988," S. 2751, October 18, 1988;
Naegele, 26.

187

the 1988 bill. Reagan's veto allowed Burns the opportunity to capitalize on the
cumulative perceived failings of John Melcher to solve the divisive wilderness
issue. Burns won the election, in part, as a result of the Reagan veto.441
Meanwhile, the Forest Service's new Northern Region Forester John Mumma
became intertwined in the process of the 1988 Montana Wilderness debate.
Mumma and his staff responded to the demands of members of Congress who
wanted immediate access to information on the Montana Roadless areas.
Montana Representatives Pat Williams and Ron Marlenee, along with
Minnesota's Bruce Vento, toured the roadless areas with Mumma for a firsthand
look at the subjects of their deliberations. Mumma then testified in support of
the 1988 Montana bill, an unpopular position within the Forest Service since the
88 bill almost doubled the wilderness acreage recommended by the Forest
Service in their separate forest plans.442
According to Mumma, he ran afoul of Montana's Republican congressional
representatives, timber industry officials, and the wise use movement, in part
because of his support for the 1988 bill and his emphasis on wilderness
management within Region One. Mumma funded pioneer wilderness education
programs at Lolo National Forest's historic Nine Mile remount depot, and

^Interview with Bill Cunningham, Naegele, 26-27; Interview with Tom
Donahue, March 17, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.
^Interview with John Mumma, February 10, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.
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established a wilderness management office at Northern Region headquarters.
Mumma's service on a wolf reintroduction committee and his refusal to cut the
full allowable sale quantity of timber on Northern Region forests (and violate
federal law) led to his forced reassignment to the Washington Office in
November 1991. Rather than accept the transfer, Mumma created a sensation
when he took an early retirement and publicly discussed his dismissal.443
With the election of Conrad Burns, and with the perennial reelection of
staunch wilderness opponent Ron Marlenee to the eastern district seat in the
House, Republicans held half the Montana congressional delegation after 1988.
Stung by earlier legislative failures, Baucus and Williams approached the
wilderness issue with caution in the early 1990s. Max Baucus faced reelection
in 1990, and he clearly did not wish to deal with a wilderness bill during his
campaign.444 This political consideration by Baucus helped to negate a unique
citizen's attempt to contribute to a wilderness solution in 1990.
Montana organized labor had lost a friend in Congress when John Melcher lost
in 1988, and they feared losing Max Baucus in 1990. Perceiving wilderness as
a key contributory element in Melcher's defeat, Montana state AFL-CIO
Executive Secretary Don Judge wanted the issue resolved and removed from the
election agenda. Consequently, Judge and the AFL-CIO approached Montana
^Ibid.
^Naegele, 27.
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environmental groups early in 1990 with a proposal to work out a compromise
for at least two Montana national forests, the Lolo and Kootenai.445
Without congressional or Forest Service interference446, the millworkers and
preservationists constructed a compromise reminiscent of what public lands legal
and historical scholar Charles F. Wilkinson describes as the optimum method for
resolving western lands disputes in his book, The Eagle Bird.447 The political
constituencies of the Lolo-Kootenai region were feasible for an accord because
of the strong tradition of organized labor and of environmental activism.
Groups of millworkers met face to face with preservationists to pore over
roadless area data in a series of meetings. These meetings produced wilderness
recommendations that were approved by the combined groups with a vote.448
The product of this unprecedented dialogue were called the Lolo-Kootenai
Accords. Actually, the agreement produced two separate accords. The Lolo
Accord followed closely the old RARE II conservationist Alternative W

^Interview with Bill Cunningham, March 31, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes;
Interview with Don Judge, April 20, 1993, Missoula, MT, notes.
44"The

Forest Service, conspicuously absent from the negotiations, provided
map and informational support to the accords process.
^Interview with Bill Cunningham; Charles F. Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird:
Mapping a New West, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 145. Wilkinson
argues that federal legislation should be the product of agreements that are made
from the ground up. Congress should ratify local accords between competing
interests.
^Interview with Bill Cunningham; Interview with Don Judge.
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recommendations with 355,500 acres designated for wilderness and 430,700
released to development. The Kootenai Accord was surprisingly somewhat
stronger, recommending 430,610 acres for wilderness. Senator Baucus picked
up the accords and introduced them in the Senate as a proposed wilderness bill
in July 1990. When the bill failed to receive support from Senator Burns, and
with his election in the balance, Baucus dropped his support of the accords. He
won reelection.449
In 1991 Baucus once again introduced the Lolo-Kootenai Accords in the
Senate.450 This time the bill failed because of the determined opposition of
Kootenai area citizen activists opposed to any reduction in the local timber
base.451 The timber industry looked with alarm at the anticipated 'lock up' of
2.2 billion board feet of timber contained in the proposed new wilderness areas.
Timber industry officials resented not being included in the formulation of the
accords, and questioned the participants' qualifications to make public land
policy.452

^^United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2d Session, "Kootenai and Lolo
National Forest Management Act of 1990,"'S.2832, July 10, 1990; Interview
with Bill Cunningham; Naegele, 27.
450United

States Senate, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, "Kootenai and Lolo
National Forest Management Act of 1991," S.72, January 14, 1991.
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Local Libby, Montana, logging firm owner Bruce Vincent and his wise use
activist group, Communities for a Great Northwest, led the fight against the
accords. Local media were bombarded with letters opposing the idea and labor
interests lost heart in the midst of fierce opposition from their fellow residents.
Faced with outright local citizen opposition, Max Baucus again retreated from
the accords and let his legislative proposal die. In retrospect, accords participant
Bill Cunningham believes the accords were not "a politically viable vehicle,"
and that with the Kootenai Accord the participants attempted "too big a step in
too short a time."453 However, the Lolo-Kootenai Accords stand as a national
example of a way to escape the increasing polarization of western land use
groups.
As citizen and congressional attempts to achieve a wilderness bill for the state
of Montana in the post-RARE II era continually met with frustration, the
citizens of Montana increasingly polarized into competing and intransigent
positions. Significantly for the future of statutory wilderness, this polarization is
not limited to the natural competing interests of preservation and utilization, but
also exists within the environmental community. Representing the split within

453Interview

with Bill Cunningham.
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environmental groups in western wilderness politics is the rise in notoriety of
the Missoula-based Alliance for the Wild Rockies, formed in 1988.454
The Alliance formed to offer an alternative to the standard congressional
method of state delegation control of wilderness legislation. Disillusioned with
the paralysis in achieving meaningful, scientifically grounded wilderness
protection for the northern Rocky Mountains 'ecoregion', the Alliance sought a
national audience and constituency. In 1990, the Alliance's director Mike Bader
announced the group's crafting of a Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act
(NREPA)455
NREPA posits the protection of wilderness, irrespective of political
boundaries, that is instead based on scientifically determined ecosystems and the
relatively new idea of ecosystems management. NREPA recognizes three major
ecosystems in the Northern Rockies: the Greater Glacier/Continental Divide; the
Greater Yellowstone; and the immense Greater Salmon River area. Smaller
ecosystems and connecting corridors round out this futuristic multi-state plan.
Missoula lays geographically in the middle of the triangular ecosystem plan.

454An

example of the split in the local western Montana environmental
movement is the Lolo-Kootenai Accords process. The Alliance was not
included in the negotiations primarily because of their no-compromise stand on
wilderness preservation.
455Sherry

Devlin, "Five State Wilderness; Advocates go for Broke with
National Appeal to Preserve 25 Million Acres," Missoulian. March 1, 1990, B-l,
B-2.
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NREPA seeks the protection of most remaining roadless areas as wilderness, six
million acres in Montana alone.456 In pursuing an ecosystem based wilderness
proposal, and by appealing to a national constituency, the Alliance might very
well represent the future of statutory wilderness.
The Alliance conflicts with traditional preservationist groups by its rejection of
operating within the existing confines of congressional wilderness politics.
Mainstream groups resent the no-compromise attitude proffered by the Alliance.
During the Kootenai-Lolo Accords process, the Alliance chose not to participate
in what they determined was a compromise endeavor. Congress's latest attempt
to solve Montana's wilderness dilemma ended like all the previous attempts- in
failure. Senator Burns became involved in wilderness politics in 1990 when he
initially introduced a bill that would release 3 million roadless acres to
development with RARE II scope recommendation for new wilderness. Baucus
followed up Burns with a proposal of his own, with a by now familiar package
of wilderness recommended. These competing bills in 1990 (they went nowhere
in Congress), plus the residual effects of the failed Lolo-Kootenai Accords

456The

Alliance for the Wild Rockies, "The Northern Rockies Ecosystem
Protection Act," informational bulletin, March, 1990; Public Meeting of the
Alliance the Wild Rockies, November 17, 1992, Missoula County Public
Library, Missoula, MT, notes.
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process, laid the foundation for the proposed Montana National Forest
Management Act of 1992.457
The 1992 bill represented a compromise between Senators Burns and Baucus,
one that left preservationists of all positions decidedly unsatisfied. The
compromise bill recommended only 1.1 million acres of wilderness and
contained unacceptable release language (the compromise bill came with a strict
release provision that precluded many forms of judicial review and foreclosed
many future wilderness designation opportunities). Once Burns and Baucus
agreed to the compromise, they refused to discuss changes.458
Problems arose with the Burns Baucus compromise when it went to the
House 459 Representatives Williams and Bruce Vento amended the bill to
increase the acreage to 1.4 million acres and reform the hard release language.
This version of the wilderness bill was palatable to mainstream preservationist
groups such as Montana Wilderness Society and for the most part to Senator
Baucus, who fashioned an additional compromise with Williams, with an

457Naegele,

28; Interview with Bill Cunningham; for a description of Burns's
1990 roadless legislation, see; Sherry Devlin, "Burns Introduces Wilderness
Bill," Missoulian, March 7, 1990, 1; Baucus's bill: United State Senate, 101st
Congress, 2d Session, "Montana Interim Roadless Lands Release and
Conservation Act of 1990," S.2403, April 3, 1990.
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impending electoral recess closing in. Incensed, Burns felt Baucus had
abandoned him and had made a separate deal with Williams without his input.
Burns offered his further modifications of the bill, which Baucus rejected.
Perceiving himself shut-out of the new bill, Burns opposed it and waited for the
next Congress.460 Baucus's attempt to bring the bill to the floor of the Senate
for approval was frustrated by a logjam of senate business and by the opposition
of five Republican senators led by Alan Simpson of Wyoming, and the bill died.
The post-RARE II attempt to pass a wilderness bill for Montana is a long,
complicated story of political stagnation and polarization. Parochial politics, in
which state congressional delegations hold near absolute power over a bill's
success or failure, have been consistently unable to rise above the din of
competing interests and pass a bill. RARE II's failure to provide a national
solution provided for the opportunity to designate wilderness areas such as
Missoula's Rattlesnake, but it also engendered an increasingly hostile,
institutionalized polarization within the citizens and visitors to Missoula and
Montana.

460Conrad

author.

Burns to David Jackson, November 2, 1992, copy in possession of

CONCLUSION

Western Montana's forest history, centered on Missoula, echoes the profound
dilemma of how to manage the nation's forests to account for all competing
uses. The Forest Service tried to be all things to all people with their Multiple
Use philosophy and has failed to please anyone. Now the once-proud agency of
Gifford Pinchot struggles to define its mission in an era when no public
consensus on what that mission should be seems possible. Complicating this
situation is a growing scarcity of both wild places and natural resources; scarcity
breeds polarization that makes an accommodation about the future of Montana's
forests a remote happening.
People who depend upon the land to earn a living live in and next to the
forests of western Montana. These people sometimes are multi-generation
Montanans who have logged, mined, and grazed the national forests and in the
process created a way of life and communities linked to the gainful use of the
forest. With increasing scarcity of commercial timber available for harvest,
these people's traditional existence is in jeopardy and they are angry. People
and jobs, family and community, should come first before the land can be
locked away for some spiritual and aesthetic purpose.
Others, both long-term Montanans, recent arrivals, and regular visitors, see a
scarcity of traditional American wild land heritage. Economic exploitation,
196
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driven by capitalistic excess, threatens the one element of American uniqueness,
that of unspoiled expanses of wild, untamed wilderness. This resource is a
necessity to provide an alternative to the rigors of civilized life. With the
wilderness extracted away, and its dependent biological life exterminated,
humankind as a whole will face destruction. Wilderness preserves a means to
measure the health of humankind and an outlet for the nourishing of souls.
When polarization occurs because of such fundamental considerations, a
solution seems impossible. The history of wilderness in western Montana,
Missoula, and Lolo National Forest reflects win-lose scenarios, count the
number of forest use/wilderness controversies. Montana is unique in its
composition of competing interests, nowhere more so than in Missoula. This
reality makes controversy more intense and passionate; Missoula is an exposed
nerve ending for wilderness issues.461
Given its history, Missoula perhaps might be the place to look for a solution to
the wilderness dilemma. If a solution can be found in the atmosphere of
animosity that surrounds wilderness politics in Missoula, then that solution will
be a viable model for the nation as a whole. Missoula both reflected and made
wilderness and forest history; the small Rocky Mountain city is both unique and
representative of an American West dominated by the presence of federal public

461Interview

with Thomas Payne, November 5, 1992, Missoula, MT, notes.

lands and containing the last vestiges of a wilderness that once covered the
continent.
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